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Stephen H. Greetham

WATER PLANNING, TRIBAL VOICES, AND
CREATIVE APPROACHES: SEEKING NEW PATHS
THROUGH TRIBAL-STATE WATER CONFLICT
BY COLLABORATION ON STATE WATER
PLANNING EFFORTS
ABSTRACT
More than a century after the Supreme Court issued its
foundational Indian water law cases, only a handful of American
Indian tribes have secured decrees or settlements of legally
enforceable water rights. Efforts to resolve tribal water claims
are typically hampered by legal and factual complexities as well
as the equitable and political legacy of the United States’ western
expansion. Meanwhile, those difficulties notwithstanding,
planners are refining their methodologies and rising to new
challenges our water resource management systems now face
(e.g., climate variability, aging infrastructure, changing usevalue priorities, etc.). Signaling a departure from exclusive
reliance on formal dispute resolution mechanisms for facilitating
tribal-state engagement on water resource issues, states have
begun to engage tribal governments in collaborative water
planning efforts. While planning cannot serve as a substitute for
the enforceable legal finality of a decree or congressionally
approved settlement, tribal-state collaboration in appropriate
context and structure may present new opportunities for making
overdue progress. Drawing on law, history, political science,
Native American studies, and principals of dispute resolution and
management, this article situates and explores the experiences of
California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma in their outreach to
tribes in state-led water planning efforts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early twentieth century water planning facilitated development of massive
infrastructure and made widespread western settlement and economic development
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possible.1 While they do not create law, these plans and the projects they produced
gave shape to the physical, economic, and policy context in which the law has long
been applied. Largely coinciding with federal assimilationist and terminationist
policies2 though, the government developed its plans without tribal input and with
little concern for the adverse impact its projects would have on tribal lands,
resources, and collective legal rights. This boundary limitation imposed on first
generation water plans—the exclusion of tribal voices and failure to integrate
identifiable tribal interests—has thus contributed to generations of complex and
confounding water resource conflicts, which regularly sharpen tribal-state conflict
lines.
Today, rising to a new era of challenges, water planners are refining their
art and bending themselves to the task of developing new strategies, institutions,
and funding priorities to address this century’s resource management challenges.3
Like the earlier plans, today’s will not decide legal rights; nonetheless, they will
establish frameworks and relationships that will shape how we move forward with
our inherited conflicts. I have previously suggested that adapting water planning
boundary conditions to better integrate tribal voices—an approach that would seem
more in keeping with modern policies that support tribal self-determination and
government-to-government engagement4—may provide opportunities for
productive intergovernmental collaboration.5 This article further explores the
concept.

1. E.g., John R. Mather, WATER RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTION, USE, AND MANAGEMENT 294, 296301 (1984); W. Eugene Hollon, THE GREAT AMERICAN DESERT, THEN AND NOW 160,161-74 (1966).
2. E.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 1.04-1.06, at 71-93 (Nell Jessup
Newtoned., 2012) (hereinafter, “COHEN’S”).
3. See, Water Resources Planning Act, Pub. L. 89-80, § 2, 79 Stat. 244 (1965) (declaring national
policy of encouraging “the conservation, development, and utilization of water and related land
resources . . . on a comprehensive and coordinated basis”); National Water Commission Act, Pub. L. 90515, § 3(a), 82 Stat. 868 (1968) (directing newly established commission to evaluate “national water
resource problems” and, in doing so, “consider economic and social consequences of water resource
development”); Cal. Water Code § 10004(a) (West 2001) (directing plan “for the orderly and
coordinated control, protection, conservation, development, and utilization of the water resources of the
state”); NMSA 1978, § 72-14-3.1 (2003) (directing “comprehensive state water plan” to serve as
“strategic management tool” for enumerated objectives); Okla. Stat.tit. 82 § 1086.1 (1992) (directing
plan “for the management, protection, conservation, structural and nonstructural development and
utilization of water resources,” with particular emphasis on “excess and surplus waters,” and
enumerating specific considerations); See also, James P. Morris, Who Controls the Waters?
Incorporating Environmental and Social Values in Water Resource Planning, 6 Hastings W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 118-19, 120-29 (2000) (discussing history and
evolution of modern water planning); Cf., Kathleen A. Miller, Grappling with Uncertainty: Water
Planning and Policy in a Changing Climate, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 395, 39596, 406-07 (2010) (discussing methods for adapting water planning to the uncertainties presented by
climate change).
4. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.07 at 93-108.
5. See, Stephen H. Greetham, Water Planning: An Opportunity for Managing Uncertainties at the
Tribal-State Interface?, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 593, 594, 604-13 (2012). Accord, Curtis Berkey, Tribal
Participation in California Water Planning 1-5 (November 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.berkeywilliams.com/docs/Briefing_Paper_2009_Tribal_Water_Summit.pdf.
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Of course, fostering collaboration among heterogeneous interests is a
challenge,6 particularly when polarizing legal disputes remain outstanding. All the
same, while natural resource fights do not intuitively foster partnerships,
cooperative engagement in this area does occur, even across cultural, legal, and
political lines7, and such occurrences–whether they succeed or fail prompt useful
questions starting with: What can we learn from those experiences? What do they
teach about the hurdles inherent to the tribal-state dynamic? What do they teach
about how competing sovereignty and proprietary concerns might be handled (or at
least not harmed) by supplemental approaches potentially capable of securing
additional social goods? And more to the point: Are there not other, perhaps
supplemental, mechanisms we can rely on in our efforts to reach workable
resolutions of longstanding conflict?
Discussions of tribal water tend to focus on conflict and injustice. As
political scientist Burton wryly notes:
There is a vast literature bemoaning the immoral treatment of
indigenous Americans, in part because there is no shortage of
examples of such treatment. Less common is some consideration
of how we might go about righting old wrongs (restoring tribal
water supplies) without committing news ones (taking water
from non-Indians who thought they had acquired good title to it
under state law).8
The point of this article, however, is not to add to the literature “bemoaning” the
treatment of American Indian tribes. It is instead intended to lay out a sober
overview of relevant dynamics for purposes of examining a potential mechanism
for increasing the likelihood of improving tribal-state efforts in a manner that
affirms American Indian rights and sovereignty without undue disruption to the
complex of equities and otherwise lawful rights vested during the past centuries of
tribal dispossession. Efforts to achieve fair and workable resolutions of reserved
tribal rights must continue, and in those efforts, there is no substitute for the
enforceable finality only legal proceedings can provide; all the same, water
planning may offer useful tools for improving our approaches to tribal-state water
conflict in those instances where enforceable finality has not yet been achieved. For
such potential to be realized, planners must break from the boundary conditions of
prior generations and actively seek the integration of tribal voices into the
collaborative fact finding and assessment, issue spotting, and strategic policy
formation processes that make up modern water planning.
With this potential in mind, this article evaluates the context and
experience of tribal-state engagement in water planning, focusing specifically on

6. Edella Schlager and William Blomquist, Resolving Common Pool Resource Dilemmas and
Heterogenities Among Resource Users 1 (June 10-14, 1998) (unpublished conference paper),
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/1009/schlager.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
7. E.g., Zoltán Grossman, Unlikely Alliances: Treaty Conflicts and Environmental Cooperation
between Native American and Rural White Communities, AM. IND. CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 29.4 at
21-43 (2005). Professor Grossman’s article has been expanded to his recent book: Unlikely Alliances:
Native Nations and White Communities Join to Defend Rural Lands (2017).
8. Lloyd Burton, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW x (1991).
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state outreach to, and integration of, tribal government participation in state water
planning efforts. As foundation for the discussion, Part II situates recurrent and
archetypal tribal-state water conflict interests—interests that go beyond the water
resources themselves—within the relevant legal and historical setting and offers a
brief assessment of how traditional adversarial modes of conflict resolution, i.e.,
litigation and formal negotiation, have fared in reconciling those interests. Part III
examines water planning as an evolving tool for approaching complex common
pool resource challenges and reviews specific state efforts (by California, New
Mexico, and Oklahoma) to integrate tribes into their planning processes, and
evaluates those efforts to discern broader lessons before offering broader
observations. Part IV offers a conclusion, lessons learned, and questions for us to
answer moving forward.
II.
A.

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES:
CONTEXT, INTERESTS, AND HOW WE HAVE FARED SO FAR
The Origin, Context, and Contours of Western Water Conflict

From the Louisiana Purchase9 to the Gadsden Purchase,10 the United
States took a mere fifty years to stretch from the Mississippi to the Pacific.11 It took
only another fifty-eight years to establish state governments throughout the region.
On the one hand, the United States’ settlement of the American West offers a
breathtaking example of territorial expansion and administrative nation-building;
on the other, however, it offers the violent story of colonial and military
displacement of North American indigenous populations—a displacement followed
by the ongoing legalistic expansion of a plenary and paternalistic control of tribal
peoples and resources.12 Today, more than a century later, we continue to work to
resolve the conflicts, inequities, and policy implications set in motion during this
period.
As the United States expanded westward, the norms of constitutional
federalism evolved generally to privilege state primacy in local water allocations.13
Toward the end of the United States’ period of westward expansion, however, in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company, the United States
Supreme Court reasserted the superiority of federal law,14 holding that Congress’s

9. Louisiana Purchase Treaty, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 30, 1803, 2 Stat. 245.
10. Gadsden Treaty, Mex.-U.S., Jun. 8, 1854, 10 Stat. 1031.
11. Proclamation, 37 Stat. 1728 (Feb. 14, 1912) (proclaiming statehood for Arizona, the last of the
continental states to enter the Union).
12. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-5.03, at 383-405 (2005); See also, Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 221 (1903) (concluding federal plenary authority empowers the United States
to unilaterally abrogate treaties with American Indian tribes in the disposition of tribal land resources);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380, 384-85 (1886) (concluding federal plenary authority vests
Congress with requisite authority to enact statutes for the regulation of affairs internal to tribal
communities without regard to constitutional basis or consideration of lack of tribal political franchise in
federal systems).
13. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653, 656-63 (1978) (discussing statutory history of
federal water development as basis for deference to state law).
14. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,174 U.S. 690, 703-06 (1899).
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practice of deferring to state law water allocation systems did not, of itself, signal
the United States’ abandonment of its constitutional prerogatives with respect to
broader federal interests, thus providing the fundamental conflict line in western
water battles—competing assertions of state and federal rights and authority.15
Within the decade, the Court decided United States v. Winans16 and
Winters v. United States,17 a pair of rulings that frame the tribal reserved rights
doctrine—a rule of the federal common law of Indian affairs that holds, first, a
tribal nation reserves to itself those rights not ceded by treaty or direct operation of
federal law18 and, second, the United States reserves from public use water sufficient
to accomplish its purpose when it sets aside land for the use and benefit of an
American Indian tribe.19 Given the affirmation of paramount federal law, tribal
reserved rights have long been held to be outside the presumed ambit of substantive
state primacy,20 providing the next and most relevant conflict line—the bounds of
tribal versus state right and authority.
Throughout the Twentieth Century, the legal and factual situation grew
more complex. For reasons remote from (and typically contrary to) tribal interests,
the federal government engaged in massive reclamation projects that fostered an
explosion in water development and dramatically altered the physical nature and
operation of the region’s watercourses.21 Operating in conjunction with local water
law systems and the economics and politics that drove them, these projects
contributed to a significant over-allocation and eventual over-utilization of water
resources as overseen by an expanding and increasingly conflicted federal-state
water bureaucracy,22 typically to the detriment of tribes whose reserved rights had
yet to be perfected.23 These dynamics gave rise to two lasting characteristics of our
water laws: first, the vesting of diverse, overlapping, and conflicting sovereign,
proprietary, and equitable interests in a limited resource; and second, the evolution
of a complex body of federal statutes and regulations24 designed to address
15. E.g., Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242-67 (2006).
16. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
17. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
18. E.g., COHEN’S, supra n.2, § 2.02[2] (describing Supreme Court conceptualization of “an Indian
treaty as a grant of rights from the tribe to the United States, with the tribe reserving for itself all
interests not clearly ceded,” which rule is a fundamental element of the reserved rights doctrine).
19. E.g., id. § 19.02 (describing implied reservation of water rights recognized in Winters in
relation to rights recognized in Winans).
20. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); See also, New Mexico v.
Aamodt, et al., 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (1976).
21. E.g., Marc Reisner, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER
145-213 (1986); See also, Hollon, supra n.1, at 160-80.
22. See, Donald J. Pisani, WATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY
1-49 (1996).
23. See, U.S. National Water Commission, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 476 (1973)
(observing “in the water-short West, billions of dollars have been invested, much of it by the Federal
Government, in water resource projects benefiting non-Indians but using water in which the Indians
have a priority of right if they choose to develop water projects of their own in the future”),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973/html/CZIC-hd1694-a57-1973.htm.
24. See generally, Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1388; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321- 4370m-12.
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environmental and public participation considerations not present when the original
infrastructure and water use allocation systems were developed and implemented.
These characteristics provide our next set of conflicting interests, neither of which
neatly conform to a “one versus another” construct—first, non-tribal property right
claimants who are general beneficiaries, both legally and politically, of state water
law allocation systems but are also frequently vested in the operation of federal
water projects; and, second, non- government public interest groups engaged in the
implementation of major federal environmental statutes or public lands law. In
addition to implicating tribal, state, and federal governmental interests, these
complex aggregations of non-governmental interest introduce to the mix non-tribal
use-rights arising under state law and non-property use-value interests represented
by advocacy organizations.25
Meanwhile, as the facts and associated interests grew more complex, only
modest progress was made in converting tribal reserved right claims to meaningful
value. In the century since the Court issued its Winans and Winters decisions, two
challenges have predominated: First, with respect to the particulars of water law,
neither ruling offered much in the form of guidance as to how to disentangle tribal
from state sovereignty interests or tribal property rights from those claimed under
state law.26 Second, efforts to develop fair and workable claims resolution have so
far produced only limited success. Those ongoing efforts at disentanglement,
definition, and resolution turn on a consistent practical question: What is the legally
actionable definition of each tribe’s reserved right as applied within a fact pattern
that typically has been shaped by state law normative water right systems and
competing non-tribal legal, equity, and policy interests?27 Without a concrete
answer to that question, everything else remains provisional and uncertain, at least
for tribes and those whose rights may be subject to a federal law-based tribal claim.
It is through this thicket of colonial legacy, constitutional law and
federalism, national growth, tribal sovereignty, private property, economic interest,
and environmental law and policy that each tribal-state water conflict, particularly
in the West,28 must find its way. For those planning the trip, pack a lunch, for that
is not an easy path to walk.
25. The terms “use-right” and “use-value” are intended to highlight the distinction between: (1) a
right based on possession of a proprietary interest, the exercise of which is typically for purposes of a
private good; and (2) a social utility or non-proprietary public good served by a certain mode of water
use, such as leaving a flow in situ to support ecological, aesthetic, recreational, or other indirect
economic values.
26. See, Greetham, supra note 5, at 594-99 (offering an overview of the significance and limitations
of Winans and Winters in disentangling the specific substance of tribal water rights from state law
normative riparian or appropriative water allocation systems). Cf. Pisani, supra note 22, at 170 (noting
the Bureau of Reclamation’s early inter-agency insistence on quantification of tribal claims in accord
with state law appropriative rules rather than reserved right principles).
27. See, Greetham, supra note 5, at 599 n.17 (discussing significance of distinction between
defining versus quantifying tribal reserved rights). Cf., Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary
Indian Water Settlements In The Second Treaty Era 32 (2002) (Tribal governments are increasingly
turning from courtroom battles to practical efforts to translate their paper rights into tangible benefits for
the reservation.).
28. While reserved rights are typically associated with western water and tribal reservation land
contexts, it merits noting that legal scholars have long contested that limitation, See, Hope M. Babcock,
Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some
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Situated Perspectives

Conflicts over common pool resources, such as water, can be uniquely
complex. Each water system presents its own hydrologic and ecologic context and
characteristics, but as political scientists Edela Schlager and William Blomquist
note, heterogeneity among resource user interests also significantly contributes to
common pool conflict complexity. These variations “present real challenges to
gaining a common understanding of their shared problems, to communication, to
devising fair rules of access and use, and to monitoring and enforcement of those
rules.”29 In turn, this diversity informs perspectives on the disputed resource itself,
introducing another level of complexity, i.e., each individual actor’s sense of the
problem to be solved.30 While the particular setting and sets of interests,
perspectives, and senses of the problem must be carefully assessed on their own
terms and in the context of a particular conflict,31 the broad historical, legal, and
policy setting of western water conflicts allows us, at least for present purposes, to
outline an archetypal set of interests, the contours of which help us to understand
the shape and flavor of what parties bring to the table and what they seek from
engagement.
1.

American Indian Tribes

The peoples indigenous to North America are diverse in their histories,
cultures, and the landscapes that comprise their homelands. Regardless of that
diversity, a significant commonality is tribal status as political and cultural
collectives that, similar to other collectives, seek recognition of and respect for
their distinct identity and right to exist as such. Federal Indian law and policy
scholar Charles Wilkinson discusses this as the goal of achieving “a measured
separatism”—one that differs from the goals of other cultural or ethnic groups
engaged in civil rights struggles in that it seeks not only a normative equality of
individual rights but also a group right to “homelands . . . islands of tribalism
largely free from interference” from non-tribal systems, including state
governments.32 Notwithstanding the diminished and checker-boarded tribal
jurisdictions that have resulted from various and conflicting federal policies, the
Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006); Judith V. Royster, Winters in the East: Tribal
Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 169 (20002001); Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L.J.
979 (1998). More importantly, negotiating parties appear likewise not to have seen themselves as so
limited. E.g., Water Infrastructure Improvement for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114-322, § 3608, 33 Stat 2
(Dec. 16, 2016) (approving, among others, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Chickasaw Nation
Water Settlement); Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 100-228, § 7, 101 Stat. 1560
(Dec. 31, 1987) (approving Seminole Nation water rights compact); Kickapoo Tribe Water Rights
Settlement Agreement (settlement pending federal approval) (on file with author).
29. Schlager and Blomquist, supra note 6, at 1.
30. William M. Adams, et al., Managing Tragedies: Understanding Conflict Over Common Pool
Resources, 302 SCIENCE 1915, 1915-16 (2003).
31. Schlager & Blomquist, supra note 6, at 3 (commending use of Elinor Ostrom’s institutional
analysis and development framework).
32. Charles Wilkinson, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, at 14 (1987). Accord Robert A.
Williams, Jr., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA xxxv-xxxvi (2005).
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core tribal goal remains: To exist and thrive as unique political, ethnic, and cultural
collectives—to continue.33
Flipping the lens around, federal and state policy makers and advocates
have frequently treated tribal “separatism” and continuance as something to be
tolerated and managed until broader assimilationist goals can be achieved, a
dynamic that has been present from the outset of the federal common law of
American Indian affairs. In Worcester v. Georgia,34 example, Chief Justice
Marshall laid out a robust framework for the protection of tribal sovereignty,
famously holding “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force . . . .”35 Importantly, though, what motivated the Court’s
opinion was not a respect for an inherent and self-evident tribal right to
sovereignty. (Indeed, the Cherokee Nation was not even a party to the lawsuit.36)
Instead, the Court was preoccupied with affirming an overriding federal interest in
monopolizing relations with tribal nations free from state interference.37 Justice
McLean’s concurring opinion underscores that this federal-state conflict was the
Justices’ real concern:
The exercise of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is
undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. . . . At best, they can
enjoy a very limited independence within the boundaries of a
state, and such a residence must always subject them to
encroachments from the settlements around them; and their
existence within a state, as a separate and independent
community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of
the state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the
political welfare of the states, and the social advance of their
citizens, that an independent and permanent power should exist
within their limits, this power must give way to the greater power
which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of state
authority.38

33. Amanda J. Cobb, Understanding Tribal Sovereignty: Definitions, Conceptualizations, and
Interpretations, AM. STUDIES 46:3/4 115, 124 (2005) (discussing Kathy Seton’s explication of
indigenous peoplehood to emphasize “‘[t]heir struggles for self-determination are struggles to retain
and/or regain cultural solidarity which unite them as a distinct people’”); Stephen Cornell, THE RETURN
OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 7 (1988) (discussing the paramount tribal
goal of “survival: the maintenance of particular sets of social relations, more or less distinct cultural
orders, and some measure of political autonomy in the face of invasion, conquest, and loss of power”).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. Id. at 520.
36. Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20(1831) (rejecting tribe’s effort to
invoke Court’s original jurisdiction in action challenging same state laws).
37. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (“[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the Constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our
constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.” (Emphasis added.)); see also
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (restraining legal effect of tribal alienation of
lands in favor of centralized federal control).
38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593-94 (McLean, J., concurring).
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As a matter of doctrine, the Chief Justice’s views on federal primacy in
federal-tribal affairs remains the rule, though the meaning of which is still regularly
contested.39 On the other hand, the “measured separatism” the law has so far
protected, has often wrestled with and perpetuated a colonial “otherness” problem
for tribes in relation to the American constitutional system40—a problem illustrated
by Justice McLean’s argument and one that is too often compounded by the
common law’s difficulty in shaking off the rhetorics and frameworks of racism
with which this area of federal law was founded.41
This problematic and unsettled dynamic was made worse by the federal
bureaucracy’s botched attempts to address the human toll of western expansion.
For example, between 1890 and 1930—prior to which period the United States had
forcibly contained or relocated most of the West’s tribal population to reservations
and during which period had then allotted much of those reservation lands to
individual ownership, both tribal and non-tribal—the government constructed a
patchwork of tribal irrigation projects. By 1928, the United States had spent
approximately $36 million on 150 separate projects that served nearly 700,000
acres.42 While these projects were justified by tribal needs arising from federal
policies that sought to impose agricultural economies on tribal peoples forced to
live within restricted land bases, 68 percent of the acreage benefitted by these
irrigation projects was farmed by non-Indians—illustrating the disproportionate
non-tribal benefit derived from ostensibly tribal projects.43 Western water law and
policy historian Donald Pisani offers this discussion of the conversion of tribal
projects to non-tribal benefit during this period:
The Indian Irrigation Service enjoyed modest success in the
1890s, but that ended after Congress passed the Reclamation Act
in 1902. Reclamation Service officials quickly recognized that
the Indian reservations contained a great deal of land that could
be purchased or leased by white farmers and that the proceeds
from surplus land sales could be used to pay for reclaiming land
owned by whites as well as Indians. In 1907, the Reclamation
Service took over the construction of the largest irrigation
projects on Indian reservations or former reservations—with the

39. Cf. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1980) (establishing balancing
test for evaluation of respective federal, tribal, and state interests relating to state effort to regulate nonIndian activity within reservation).
40. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383-84, 390-406 (1993) (analyzing the
power-law tension inherent to the common law of federal Indian affairs and the difficulty the law has
had in mediating the subject matter’s colonial foundation within a normative constitutional framework);
see generally Frank Pommersheim, Is There a Little (Or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing
in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 271 (2003).
41. Williams, supra note 32; David E. Wilkins, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); cf. Stephen H. Greetham, Tribes in “Unexpected
Places”: The NLRA, Tribal Economic Actors, and Common Law Expectations of Tribal Authenticity,
38.4 AM. IND. Q. 427, 438-49 (2014) (analyzing challenges the common law’s understanding of “tribe”
presents in applying concepts of tribal sovereignty in the context of modern tribal economic actors).
42. Peter W. Sly, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL 14 (1988).
43. Id. at 15.
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complicity, if not full support, of the Indian Office. Officials in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs hoped that white farmers would
serve as models to would-be Indian irrigators. Therefore, they
encouraged whites to take up land on the former reservations.44
As Pisani concludes, “[b]y the 1920s, the Indian irrigation projects served far more
whites than Indians—often at the expense of the Indians.”45
Particularly when compared with the contemporaneous socio-political and
physical circumstance of tribal peoples46 and the plenary control asserted by the
federal government that came to its zenith during this time,47the failure of these and
similar federal programs to serve tribal peoples is unconscionable. But this was not
the end of the missed opportunities: By 1975, after reallocating administration of
non-tribal projects to the Bureau of Reclamation and retaining Bureau of Indian
Affairs oversight of the tribal projects, the government had made $201 million in
capital expenditures on tribal projects, though the average area under irrigation had
dropped to 648,000 acres.48 Meanwhile the federal government spent billions to
develop waters subject to tribal claim for predominantly non-tribal expansion and
economic benefit.49 This entire period of development amounted largely to an
exercise of inefficient federal paternalism, incompetently implemented and
inadequately realized, which had the effect of empowering state and other nontribal interests at the expense of tribal right and benefit.
The largest and perhaps most (in)famous example of these projects is the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP), a project authorized by Congress in 1962,50
which has never been fully funded.51 While the United States originally calculated
the Navajo Nation reserved right for the NIIP to be 787,000 acre-feet per year, nontribal political opposition to a tribal project of that size stymied progress and led to
the Navajo Nation’s being pressured to accept an ostensibly guaranteed annual
entitlement of 508,000 acre-feet, which the Department of the Interior later scaled
back to 370,000 acre-feet, citing improved water delivery efficiencies.52 Meanwhile,
as the Navajo’s water allocation was slashed to less than half of the government’s
original calculation, Congress tied the appropriation of monies for the construction
of NIIP to the San Juan-Chama Project, which was developed for the benefit of
New Mexico—though “[e]ight years after authorization, NIIP was only seventeen
percent completed” while “New Mexico’s San Juan-Chama project was about two-

44. Pisani, supra note 22, at 161.
45. Id. at 161-62.
46. See generally Institute for Gov’t Research, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928)
(documenting impact of prior federal policies), http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html.
47. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, §1.05 at 79-80; Williams, supra note 32, at 71-83, 85 n.35;
Wilkins, supra note 41, at 105-17; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
48. Sly, supra note 42, at 16-17.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
50. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Navajo
Indian irrigation project and the initial stage of the San Juan-Chama project as participating projects of
the Colorado River storage project, and for other purposes, Act of Jun. 13, 1962 Pub. L. 87-483, 76 Stat.
96 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii).
51. Sly, supra note 42, at 17-18.
52. Burton, supra note 8, at 30-31.
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thirds built.”53 Today, the Navajo Nation Council continues to work to secure the
funding and federal commitment to complete NIIP,54 while San Juan-Chama has
been in full operation for years.
Finally, as the common law continued to fumble with its handling of tribal
sovereignty, as the federal government continued to mismanage tribal assets, and as
the state’s regulatory hand grew stronger, the slow and steady trend of the western
water bureaucracy has been “to treat tribes like mere individual owners of water
rights and less like sovereigns with the authority and power to govern those water
rights within their own territories.”55 As Richard Monette frames the matter:
Indian tribes should not own water rights. Individuals own water
rights; sovereigns govern water rights . . . . Should tribes be more
like individuals, who merely own water rights under the property
scheme of some other sovereign? Or should tribes be more like
sovereigns, with the authority and power to own water and to
govern water rights within their respective territories and
jurisdictions, including the power to vest individuals with
ownership?56
Tribes, of course, have proprietary interests in water resources, but the failure of
the law and bureaucracy to adequately integrate both tribal sovereignty and
proprietary interests exacerbates the difficulty for tribal leaders seeking to obtain
that “measured separatism” with respect to their tribes’ reserved right claims.
As a whole, this history of disregard, hostility, and mismanagement
promotes a tribal skepticism, if not overt cynicism, when it comes to law, water
resources, and promises of justice.57 While the particulars vary, each tribal
government and community has some local version of this story, which tends to
bolster a sense of distrust, both among tribal leaders and the members of the
respective polity to which they owe a duty of responsibility and stewardship. It
merits emphasis that much of this history of failure, including the Indian Irrigation
Projects, is within the living memory of many tribal members and citizens—and
many more who were raised by those individuals. Furthermore, given the tendency
of the current Supreme Court to manifest sympathy for state interests over federal

53. Id. at 31.
54. See Media Release, Office of the Speaker of the 23rd Navajo Nation Council, Council moves
forward with efforts to complete the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with
author).
55. Richard Monette, One Hundred Years after Winters: The Immovable Object of Tribes’
Reserved Water Meets the Irresistible Force of States’ Reserved Rights under the Equal Footing
Doctrine, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS
CENTENNIAL 89 (Barbara Cosens et al., eds., 2012).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Cf. Pisani, supra note 22, at 160 (discussing nature of American Indian skepticism and
opposition to federal Indian Irrigation Projects); Burton, supra note 8, at 60 (“It is little wonder that
while tribal leaders are not wildly enthusiastic about negotiation, many of them are reluctant to reject
that alternative unequivocally.”). See also Berkey, supra note 5, at 2 (“Historically, Indian Tribes have
kept the State at a distance with regard to legal and political matters, no doubt due to the hostile
relationship between the State and the Tribes in the years following statehood and the numerous court
battles to protect tribal water and fishing rights.”).
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authority or tribal interests, tribal wariness of the legal system finds basis in current
events, not only history.58
Regardless of any skepticism, tribal leaders still must do what all
community leaders must do: They must navigate the broader legal and political
systems to address their communities’ material challenges with respect to securing
reliable water supplies for human consumption, economic growth, ecological
health, and, in many instances, particularized cultural and/or religious needs.59
While all polities must address similar needs, tribal government must (and do) do so
in contexts in which their governments may lack recognized legal control over the
watersheds on which they depend60 or face opposition when the law does give them
control61 (or even access to the possibility of a degree of control)62 and where
poverty rates are generally high, rates of economic development comparatively
low, and sources of government revenue constrained.63 As western and tribal water
law scholar David Getches observed, “[t]he futures of tribes have long been
trapped behind unclaimed, unusable water rights,”64 the truth of which speaks to
the ultimate material interest driving tribal efforts to resolve claims: As a general
matter, tribes want the value, utility, and benefit of legally enforceable water rights
so they can protect their homelands and provide for their own future. But they want
more than that, as well.
American Indian tribes have been able to capitalize on the late-1960s shift
in federal policy and have expanded institutional capacities in government, law,
and economic development.65 Taking advantage of “treatment in the same manner

58. Cf. Burton, supra note8, at 34, 36-37, 61-62.
59. E.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role
of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 242-47 (1996)
(discussing unique complex of challenges relating to implementation of tribal environmental
programming).
60. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Civ. No. 16-1534 (D.D.C., Jul. 27, 2016).
61. See, e.g., Montana v. U.S. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (addressing challenge to EPA’s
delegation of Clean Water Act regulatory authority to tribal environmental program); City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (addressing challenge to EPA’s integration of
tribal water quality standards in permitting of upstream off-reservation discharges).
62. See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users,
Pub. L. 109-59, § 10,211, 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005) (imposing unique procedural requirements on
tribes in Oklahoma seeking “tribes as states” status); Travis Snell, Tribal officials angry over
transportation bill, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, May 3, 2006, http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Arti
cle/index/1417; Editorial, Filling the Bill: Inhofe’s sage rider targets tribes, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 11,
2005 http://newsok.com/article/2907126.
63. Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE
NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 112-22 (2008).
64. David Getches, Foreward, to NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN
THE ARID WEST xiv (Bonnie Colby et al., 2005).
65. Harvard Project, supra note 65, at 115 (observing tribes have “leverage[d] policies of selfdetermination into self-selected investments and focus on developing the legal, regulatory, and physical
infrastructure that rewards productivity, holds decision makers accountable, and holds down the risks of
political instability for individuals and businesses”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest
Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 74 (2007).
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as states” provisions in certain major environmental statutes,66 many tribes may
also now operate environmental programs and have promulgated standards
governing activities within or affecting their jurisdictional territories.67 While the
legacy of failed federal policies–e.g., poverty, unemployment, and other economic
and associated social challenges–remains problematic throughout Indian country,
tribal economic and governance capacities have grown, as has a collective tribal
ability to impact matters affecting tribal communities.68 And with respect to that
central tribal-state conflict line, federal Indian law scholar Matthew L.M. Fletcher
argues that “American Indian law is transforming”:
The political relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes remains, but a new and more dynamic relationship between
states and Indian tribes is growing. States and Indian tribes are
beginning to smooth over the rough edges of federal Indian
law— jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity between
states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax
revenue, economic development opportunities, and regulatory
authority— through cooperative agreements. In effect, a new
political relationship is springing up all over the nation between
states, local units of government, and Indian tribes. . . . Many
states now recognize tribes as de facto political sovereigns, often
in the form of a statement of policy whereby the state agrees to
engage Indian tribes in a government-to-government relationship
mirroring federal policy. The tribal-federal political relationship
remains, but more and more tribal-state political relationships
form every year . . . .69
Sovereignty, as among governments, is a constant negotiation. Its exercise
and health requires engagement and relationship, not the mere drawing of lines or
the defining of legal rights. Monette implies this point when discussing tribes as
sovereigns, not merely proprietors, and David Wilkins and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesilk
Stark state the point more directly when arguing that tribal survival has long
“necessitated the practice of aboriginal sovereigns negotiating political compacts,
treaties, and alliances with European nations and later the United States.”70 All of
this, Wilkins and Kiiwetinepinesilk Stark argue, is part of a broader “governmental
interdependency” that is inherent to the modern exercise of all sovereignties,
requiring the constant negotiation, development, and maintenance of relationships

66. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(2012); Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1377(e)
(2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2012); Stephen Greetham, Native American Sovereignty
and the Clean Water Act: The Historic Judicial Treatment of Tribal Sovereign Powers and Recent
Statutory Reforms, 3 N.U. FORUM 1 (1998); Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality
Standards Dispute: Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Authority over Non-Indian Reservation Lands, 20
AM. IND. L. REV. 151 (1995-1996).
67. See supra note 61 and 66.
68. Harvard Project, supra note 63, at 117-21.
69. Fletcher, supra note 65, at 74; see also Harvard Project, supra note 63, at 72-77.
70. David E. Wilkins & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesilk Stark, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 34 (2011).
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between and among sovereigns.71 Scholars have disputed the wisdom and utility of
tribal engagement with non-tribal political systems;72 as political scientist Daniel
McCool puts the question, can a “strategy of political compromise, via an alien
system of values, truly protect the long-term best interests of Indian tribes?”73
However, given that water is typically a trans-jurisdictional matter, engagement—
in one form or another—is largely unavoidable, and ultimately the success of any
engagement will be shaped by the health of the relationship of the engaged
parties.74
While not uniform throughout Indian country, the growth in tribal
government institutions and economic development has created expanding
opportunities for mutually beneficial intergovernmental alliance. The opportunity
for conflict will always inhere to the tribal-state dynamic, but as former Arizona
Governor Bruce Babbitt said on the subject:
This is not a problem, it’s an opportunity . . . . What we have is
an intergovernmental environment in which, if we could just quit
thinking of Indian tribes and nations as problems and start
thinking of them as peoples, communities, and governmental
units, we can get on which business and make it happen.75
The act of claiming and securing tangible, material value in the provision of
reliable access to necessary waters is, of course, a paramount tribal goal, but tribes
generally seek not only the water; they also seek intergovernmental relationships
that are respectful of their status as recognized political collectives and which
integrate them, as such, into the broader “governmental interdependency” of
sovereignty. They seek a mode of integration that affords “a measured separation”
within, not barred from, the evolving American legal, political, and cultural
dynamic.76 In short, in addition to water rights, tribes are generally looking for
partners who approach them in the same spirit commended by former Governor
Babbitt.

71. Id. at 38. (citing Valerie Lambert, CHOCTAW NATION: A STORY OF AMERICAN INDIAN
RESURGENCE 211 (2007)).
72. Compare Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples,
15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 (1999), (arguing the imposition of United States citizenship on
indigenous peoples was a unilateral act of colonization and advocating repeal of the Indian Citizenship
Act and indigenous resistance and general withdrawal from non-indigenous political processes) with
John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American Politics:
A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533 (2001), (responding and arguing in
rebuttal to Porter’s article). See also Carol Goldberg and Duane Champagne, Ramona Redeemed? The
Rise of Tribal Political Power in California, WICAZO SA R. 17.1 at 44 (2002).
73. McCool, supra note 27, at 9.
74. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 30, at 1916.
75. Colby, supra note 64, at 33.
76. See supra text accompanying notes32-33; see also Cobb, supra note 33, at 119-20 (discussing
inherency of sovereignty but its “political effect” as dependent on relational recognition).
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State Governments

While American Indian tribes wrestle with the challenge of colonial
“otherness,” states occupy a privileged position within the federal system. Though,
among the fundamental tensions inherent in the United States’ Constitution is the
exact metes and bounds of state versus federal power, states—particularly western
states—have consistently asserted their rights against perceived federal
overreach.77 With respect to the control and local allocation of water, states assert
those rights from a reasonably solid foundation.
The legal control and local allocation of water was largely an afterthought
in the federal government’s implementation of western expansion. With the
passage of the Homestead Act of 1862,78 Congress opened the vast western public
domain to lawful private settlement, and the resulting flood of migration increased
local needs for works to provide water for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use
throughout the predominantly arid region. As most of the land remained in federal
title, much of those works were constructed on federal lands.79 Soon thereafter
Congress enacted the Mining Act of 1866, signaling its deference with respect to
private rights to the continued use of water in accord with “local customs, laws, and
the decisions of the courts.”80 As the California Supreme Court tells the Story:
For a long period the general government stood silently by and
allowed its citizens to occupy a great part of its public domain in
California, and to locate and hold mining claims, water rights,
etc., according to such rules as could be made applicable to the
peculiar situation; and, when there were contests between hostile
claimants, the courts were compelled to decide them without
reference to the ownership of the government, as it was not urged
or presented. In this way, from 1849 to 1866, a system had grown
up under which the rights of locators on the public domain, as
between themselves, were determined, which left out of view the
paramount title of the government.81

77. See In re U.S. Dep’t of Def,, U.S. E.P.A. Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of
U.S., 817 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2016), cert granted sub nom. Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 137
S.Ct 811, 196 L. Ed. 2D 595 (2017); see also Memorandum from U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers on Administration of Clean Water Programs in Light of the Stay of the Clean Water Rule,
Improving
Transparency
and
Strengthening
Coordination
(Nov.
16,
2015),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/2015-11-16_signed_cwr_poststay_coordination_memo.pdf (This conflict line has flared most recently in relation to the Army Corps
of Engineers’ and Environmental Protection Agency’s promulgation of Clean Water Act jurisdictional
rules, which are now heading to the Supreme Court).
78. Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392, Ch. 75.
79. E.g., California, 438 U.S. 645 at 656 (1978).
80. Mining Act of 1866, 39 Cong. Ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253, 43 U.S.C. § 661.
81. Cave v. Tyler, 133 Cal. 566, 567, 65 P. 1089, 1090 (1901). Accord A. Dan. Tarlock, et al.,
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 106 (2009) (“In
settlement of the West, Congress’s silence about water rights on the public lands had been at once
confusing and convenient. The states did as they pleased.”).
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Next, Congress enacted the Desert Lands Act of 1877,82 the central act of
congressional deference in this area of the law and which the Supreme Court has
interpreted as effecting a severance of non-navigable waters within the enumerated
western states and a general reservation of those waters “for the use of the public
under the laws of the states and territories.”83 Finally Congress enacted the
Reclamation Act of 190284 to authorize the construction of massive works to
supplement local supply infrastructure for expanding non-tribal settlement,
agriculture, and industry.85 The Court has since interpreted the Reclamation Act as
generally subordinating federal operation of projects built under its authority to
state water allocation rules and administration.86
In the words of Justice Rehnquist, this statutory history manifests “the
consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by
Congress”87 though, as already noted, not without exception.88 Paramount federal
sovereignty interests have not been waived by this tradition of deference,89 nor have
the nature and extent of reserved tribal water rights been subordinated to state
substantive law.90
With respect to state substantive water law, those laws generally perform
three functions: They establish the rule system by which persons obtain new water
rights, they provide adjudicative processes for the determination of existing water
rights, and they administer the ongoing use, transfer, and distribution of established
water rights.91 The existence of inchoate federal reserved rights can challenge stateled efforts in system-wide water management and complicate administrative efforts
to define and administer property rights.92 This has particularly, though not
exclusively, been a concern in normatively appropriative systems.93

82. Desert Lands Act of 1877, Ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. 321.
83. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935); see
also California, 438 U.S. 645 at 657.
84. Reclamation Act of 1902, Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 43 U.S.C. 416.
85. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 at 663.
86. Id. at 667-70.
87. Id. at 653.
88. See U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).Cf. Tarlock, supra note
81, at 107 (“Many years after Winters the Supreme Court said that, simply passing three post-Civil War
statutes that scarcely mentioned water, Congress had deferred to the states to fashion their own water
law systems.
89. See U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703-07 (1899).
90. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 570-571 (1983).
91. Conference of Western Attorneys General, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 587 (Mazurek,
Joseph et al. eds., 2014).
92. See Oklahoma v. Tyson, 258 F.R.D. 472, 479 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (dismissing state damages
claim based on procedural implications arising from unresolved tribal water rights claims). See also
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONTANA L. REV. 97, 97 (2015). The
rights of tribes and tribal populations can also be challenged. See id. at 99. (describing generally and in
contemporary context the relationship and relative power of tribes and tribal populations with respect to
state electoral and political systems, as contrasted with the tribal-federal trust relationship).
93. Royster supra note 28 at 169 (“With one partial exception, Indian reserved rights to water have
been litigated only for reservations located in states following the prior appropriation system of state
water law rights.”).
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Starting early in the Twentieth Century, many western state legislatures
adopted water codes that provided for comprehensive water rights adjudications.94
Limitations on state substantive jurisdiction and the federal government’s sovereign
immunity, however, placed reserved rights outside the reach of state law
adjudication proceedings; indeed, the Justice Department consistently used the
reserved rights doctrine for defensive purposes only, i.e., to enjoin non-tribal
diversions or state proceedings it viewed as contrary to federal interests,95 which
thwarted state authority to conduct comprehensive water right adjudications.96 In
1952, Congress opened the door for such state authority by enacting the McCarran
Amendment,97 which serves to waive federal immunities in state-led stream
adjudications. Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has construed it as opening
the door for state court determinations of federal reserved right claims,98 and
subsequent litigation suggests a general rule that state courts are not only available
for these actions but may be the preferred forum—even where tribal water rights
are at issue.99
Tribes have continued to challenge the states’ procedural hold on the
litigation of tribal water rights,100 but state privilege has burrowed deep roots.101 In
short, states have spent considerable institutional, financial, and political capital on
securing the legal authority to control the relevant litigated processes.
This procedural advantage notwithstanding, states do not run the table.
The Supreme Court has consistently and unambiguously reaffirmed that federal
law, not state, controls the substance of tribal reserved rights.102 While this rule
may be of debatable immediate value to federal and tribal interests, given
McCarran’s empowering of state courts to take the first pass on the questions
presented,103 federal law’s substantive primacy continues to increase transactional

94. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U. S., 424 U.S. 800, 804 (1976).
95. E.g., Winters v. U. S., 207 U.S. 564, 565, (1908) (the United States seeking, and obtaining,
relief in the form of enjoining non-tribal water use, rather than a definition of the tribal water right
itself).
96. COHEN’S, supra note 2, at 19.05[1] (“Historically, the states lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Indian water rights.”).
97. See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012).
98. U.S. v. Dist. Ct. In and For Eagle County, Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
99. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983) (rejecting secondary
assault on Colorado River abstention); U.S. for and on Behalf of Acoma and Laguna Indian Pueblos v.
Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico, 806 F.2d. 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(affirming denial of removal effort).
100. E.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244, 250 (Mont. 1999)
(holding state jurisdiction over water resources limited unless determination made regarding quantity of
water “legally available,” which could not be determined without quantification of tribal reserved
rights). See also e.g., Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v. United States, et al., Civ. No. 12-275 (Mar. 12, 2012)
(motion to remove state stream adjudication to federal court).
101. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. at 570 (rejecting secondary assault on Colorado
River abstention); Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico, 806 F.2d. 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (affirming denial of removal effort).
102. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571, 580 (1983).
103. See, e.g., Scott B. McElroy & Jeff. J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States—There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597, 599, 618 (1995)
(analyzing state court handling of the substantive law of federal reserved rights).
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complexity, risk, and cost—factors which bear directly on state government pursuit
of clean and clear resolutions. In short, no matter the litigated and legislated
successes of state governments, formal resolution of reserved rights—of water
rights, in general—remains hard, expensive, and polarizing work.104 States have,
accordingly, supported increased federal investment in achieving negotiated
resolutions—acting in the belief that formal negotiations will provide a surer path
to workable resolution.105
Finally, surrounding the tribal-state relationship are the myriad of water
resource regulatory and policy responsibilities the state owes to its state-law
constituents. As Peter Sly puts it, “the state is like a ‘traffic cop’” with a “primary
interest” in the supervision and “administ[ration] of state- created water rights in a
comprehensive and simplified process, to minimize surprises and uncertainties for
water users.”106 Given the predominance and diversity of the exercise of those
“state-created water rights” and the privileged status federal law has afforded state
regulation of them, the state’s role as “traffic cop” can be fairly viewed as less a
desire to thwart tribal rights and sovereignty and more simply as a public duty—
one that strongly informs, if not drives, its interests in these matters.
In sum, states continue to seek not only resolution of reserved rights but
workable resolutions that support regulatory stability. If it is acceptable to
repurpose Justice McLean’s sour argument in Worcester, it may be fair to say states
seek a resolution to reserved rights on terms that do not “seriously embarrass or
obstruct the operation of state laws.”107 It is one thing to say that reserved rights lie
outside the reach of state authority; it is another (and far more complicated) thing to
arrive at legally actionable definitions of those reserved rights in a manner that
does justice to the claim while integrating them to a broader property rights system
without undue prejudice or harm to other lawful and equitable interests vested
under state law. The first statement presents the conflict; the second offers a form
of fair resolution. The consequence of our shared history is complex and
challenging, but states—like all sovereigns—are not inclined to abandon local
interests or claimed governmental rights based solely on appeals to that history.
Instead, fundamental to the approach of state regulators and political leaders in
these matters is a path to reconciliation that does minimal violence to current legal,
property, and power systems.
3.

The Other Parties

The tribal-state relationship, of course, does not exist in isolation. Multiple
other actors have relevant affected interests, and each has its own relationship,
common cause, and conflict with tribal and/or state sovereigns—most prominently,
the United States, non-tribal use-right claimants, and use-value advocacy
organizations.

104. See, e.g., Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, Bankrupt Rivers, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1335, 135859 (2016) (discussing high cost and transactional uncertainty of stream adjudications).
105. E.g., Western States Water Council, Resolution (Position No. 376) In Support of Indian Water
Rights Settlements (Oct. 10, 2014) (on file with author).
106. See generally Sly, supra note 42, at 47, 44-54.
107. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594.
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Of the other parties involved, the United States is the most complex. As
prime mover of the nation’s western expansion, it implemented a series of policies
designed to remove tribal populations to small corners of their pre-expansion
aboriginal homelands.108 These homelands were then made ready for non-tribal
settlement through the construction of massive reclamation and other water
infrastructure projects.109 As legacy of this history, the United States today owes a
myriad of public responsibilities, in addition to its role as fiduciary of the federaltribal trust.110 Historian Patricia Nelson Limerick describes the government’s
arguably untenable position as follows:
By 1980, Interior’s jurisdiction was a crazy mosaic. Overseeing
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the
Bureau of Mines, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of
Reclamation, the secretary of the interior wore more hats than a
head could support. The interests of mining, for instance, were
often in conflict with the interests of wildlife, of Indian people,
and of national parks. Beyond the likelihood of conflicting
interests among bureaus, the range of each bureau could make
the head spin.111
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance in sorting out management of this
mess.112 Instead offering its own complications by affirming the primacy of state
and local water allocation laws.113
As a result of this network of sovereign and proprietary rights, statutory
and common law duties, and concurrent status as sovereign, developer, and trustee,
there are few water issues in which the United States does not have a vested
interest.114 As sovereign, it must act as steward of national interests, which includes
enactment and implementation of water and natural resource protection systems

108. E.g., COHEN’S, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing sweep of tribal land losses); See also COHEN’S,
supra note 2, at 23-30, 38-41, 79-84 (discussing arc of federal policies implementing the diminishment
of tribal lands and resources); Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra note
62, at 95-98.
109. See supra notes 1, 21-23 and accompanying text.
110. E.g., Colby, supra note 64 at 14-18; Cohen, supra note 2, at 412-416.
111. Patricia Nelson Limerick, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 307 (2011). Accord Mather, supra note 1, at 305 (“Clearly, many [federal programs
dealing with water resources development and management] overlap and conflict. It is certain that even
the agencies involved do not know of all possible conflicting or supporting programs in other agencies
or, even possibly, the full ramifications of the programs they have been authorized to establish or
enforce within their own agencies.”).
112. See Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (“The Government does not ‘compromise’ its
obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously
performs another task for another interest that Congress has obliged it by statute to do.”); E.g., id. at 135
(providing an example for the same point).
113. See California v. U. S., 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978).
114. See, e.g., Mather, supra note 1, at 302 (“Current federal water laws and programs are quite
complex. More than forty federal agencies have some water programs or statutory responsibilities and
the programs keep changing.”).
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such as the Clean Water Act115 and the Endangered Species Act.116 Using its
financial and scientific resources, the government also acts in its sovereign capacity
by funding technical studies intended to better inform water resource management
and environmental protection efforts.117 As proprietor, the government acts to
protect its rights appurtenant to federal reserved lands and water infrastructure118
and, likewise, to fulfill its contractual obligations to derivative property right
holders who enjoy the use of those federal assets.119 Finally, as trustee, it has an
obligation to represent the interests of tribal sovereigns who hold reserved rights to
water resources as well as jurisdictional authorities relating to the use and
enjoyment of those resources.120 The government’s balance of these varied and
conflicting interests is driven less by the law and more by executive and legislative
branch politics and policy, with the courts simply playing referee pursuant to
statutory, common law, or constitutional standards.121 In short, government tends to
be on no one party’s side in any water dispute but, instead, manages what it views
as its interests in accord with predominating law, policies, and politics.
While the federal government could be understood as a single entity with
a myriad of interests, non-tribal property right claimants are a myriad of entities
with a singular—though individually held—interest, i.e., a property right in the use
of water, a right which is generally governed by and within a state law water
allocation system. Such use-rights are held by towns and cities, irrigators and
ranchers, energy producers and power plants, large industry, and individual
homeowners.122 Given the nature of state verses federal politics, these claimants
generally have a strong interest in protecting the state’s regulatory and management
role.123 Echoing the federal-state conflict line, this tendency can put tribal and nontribal claimants at odds.

115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
117. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION COLLABORATES WITH COLORADO
RIVER BASIN TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP IN TRIBALLY FOCUSED WATER STUDY (2013); U.S. BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP TRIBAL WATER STUDY (2016).
118. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (construing scope of federal
reserved rights appurtenant to forest service lands); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976)
(seeking injunction against groundwater diverters for purposes of protecting federal reserved water right
and associated interests).
119. See supra note 107 (enforcing federal reclamation contract obligations); see also, e.g., Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 261 (D.D.C. 1972) (reversing agency decision regarding
promulgation of flow regulation affecting Newlands Reclamation Project for failure to properly balance
federal obligations regarding prior adjudication decrees, federal fiduciary obligations to tribes, and the
contract rights of irrigators using reclamation project waters).
120. Id.; see also Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in
Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, Fed. Reg. (Mar. 12, 1990),
https://www.usbr.gov/native/policy/12mar1990_fedreg_indianwaterrights.pdf (“Indian water rights are
vested property rights for which the United States has a trust responsibility, with the United States
holding legal title to such water in trust for the benefit of the Indians.”)
121. See supra note 118.
122. Colby et al., supra note 64, at 32.
123. See, e.g., Colby et al., supra note 64, at 32; cf. Sly, supra note 42, at 49-53 (discussing state as
parens patriae).
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Finally, use-value advocates also have a significant role in these matters.
Environmental groups and recreational users are not frequent participants in tribal
water disputes, but they are regular participants in water fights more generally,
typically relying on federal statutory systems that secure public participation rights
to advocate positions framed as serving the public’s interest, such as environmental
protection and government and corporate accountability.124
4.

The Interests Aggregated

Much of the complexity summarized above arises out of, on the one hand,
the unique relationship between tribal sovereigns and the federal government and,
on the other hand, the unique competition between tribal and state sovereigns.
Viewing it as a whole, its contours drape a generalized structure built on
sovereignty and proprietary considerations: Sovereignty concerns (primarily
represented by tribal, state, and federal government parties) that focus on questions
of control, authority, autonomy, and certainty; and proprietary concerns (primarily
represented by use-right claimants, both tribal and non-tribal, and use-value
advocates such as environmental or other policy organizations) that focus on
maximal realization of an individualized material value (i.e., amount of water
reliably obtained for a desired use-right or use-value, such as for municipal,
agricultural, recreation, fish and wildlife, or other purposes).
From tribes (seeking a “measured separatism” and dynamic
intergovernmental relations) to states (seeking to protect a privileged legal position
with respect to the implementation of administrative regulatory systems necessary
for ecological and economic health) to the United States (acting on its crazy quilt of
interests and obligations) and all the use-right and use-value interests entangled
among them, each party brings legitimate concerns to the table. These interests are
each informed and shaped by history, culture, law, and context, and each, in turn,
shapes the nature of the conflict to be addressed—a conflict that typically goes far
beyond the water resource itself and, instead, ought to be viewed as part of ongoing
efforts to reconcile America’s colonial past with its constitutional present.125
In short, this is about more than water.126
C.

Traditional Tactics and Paths to Resolution

Parties typically seek resolution among this rowdy set of interests by
reliance on traditional adversarial means, i.e., litigation or the nominally more
cooperative approach of formal negotiations. Regardless of approach, the law
requires resolution of reserved rights claims to include finality and enforceability of
right.127 Exclusive focus on enforceable finality, however, tends to deepen conflict

124. Colby et al., supra note 64, at 3233.
125. See supra note 40.
126. McCool, supra note 27, at 7-9 (discussing water settlements as marking a “second treaty era.”)
127. E.g., Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 129 n.10 (1983) (“The policies advanced by the doctrine of
res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases concerning real property, land and water.”); Criteria and
Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian
Water Rights Claims, supra note 119, at 9223 (“Settlements should be completed in a way that all
outstanding water claims are resolved and finality is achieved.”)
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by miring the parties in pie-cutting zero-sum games, thus restricting combatants to
distributive competition rather than facilitating integrative cooperation. Each
approach, in its own way, has proven itself to be less than ideal.
For much of the Twentieth Century, litigation has been the primary tool
for addressing reserved rights to water,128 but such reliance has proven expensive,
polarizing, and not certain to provide clear or transportable results—in a word,
unsatisfactory. The adjudication of the rights of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern
Arapahoe tribes often serves as an illustration of the limited efficacy of litigation:
After thirty-seven years, including seven trips to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the
tribes are still unable to fully utilize their substantial decreed water right without
continued conflict and uncertainty.129 Meanwhile, lingering uncertainty due to
adversarial relations continues to inhibit economic growth and forestall ecological
restoration efforts.130 Another illustration of litigation’s limitations can be found in
northern New Mexico, where it took approximately twenty-seven years to produce
a useable legal standard for determining Pueblo water rights,131 after which a
separate district court concluded it was not bound by the product of those efforts
leaving the parties free to litigate the questions anew.132 Indeed, underscoring a
level of frustration with his state’s experience, former New Mexico State Engineer
John D’Antonio estimated it would take “another 600 years to complete the
adjudication of water rights” within its jurisdiction if it continued at its current
pace.133
With these experiences in mind, it is not hard to understand why parties
started taking a step back and moved from the courtroom to the conference table.134
In 1979, for example, Montana established its Reserved Water Rights Compact
Commission to represent the state in efforts to negotiate settlements of outstanding
reserved right claims.135 Around that same time, the Conference of Western
Attorneys General reached out to the Native American Rights Fund to, likewise,
explore the development of standard practice and procedural norms for securing
enforceable settlements, which resulted in the 1988 publication of the RESERVED

128. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 8, at 48-58 (indicating only fourteen of fifty tribal water conflicts
involved formal negotiation efforts and, of those, ten included litigation as well). Efforts to resolve
claims through negotiation were not meaningfully pursued until after promulgation of the criteria and
procedures for federal participation in tribal water settlements. See generally supra note 119.
129. E.g., McCool, supra note 27; Anne MacKinnon, Eyeing the Future on the Wind River, 15 WYO.
L. REV. 517 (2015); Jason Robison, Wyoming’s Big Horn General Stream Adjudication, 15 WYO. L.
REV. 244 (2015).
130. MacKinnon, supra note 128, at 518, 520.
131. New Mexico filed the Aamodt adjudication in 1966, and the parties thereafter completed trial
litigation over questions relating to a methodology for quantifying Pueblo water rights by 1993. See
New Mexico ex rel. State Eng’r v. Aamodt, et al., 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976); New Mexico ex rel.
State Eng’r v. Aamodt, et al., 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985); New Mexico ex rel. State Eng’r v.
Aamodt, et al., No. CV-6639 (D.N.M., Dec. 29, 1993) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
132. New Mexico ex rel. State Eng’r v. Abousleman, No. 83-1041 (Dist. Ct. N.M. Oct. 4, 2004).
133. Lora Lucero and A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth in New Mexico: Same Old,
Same Old or a New Era?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803, 819 (2003).
134. Cf. Greetham, supra note 5, at 602 n.27 (discussing tribal motivations for turning to negotiated
resolutions).
135. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-212 (1979).
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WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL136 and years of coordinated tribal-state
advocacy at the federal level for deeper federal commitment to resolution of
reserved rights claims.137
Since the 1980s, the value of the multi-party and congressionallyapproved negotiated settlement has been accepted, almost as an article of faith, as
the preferred method of formal tribal reserved right dispute resolution, though the
record suggests one may want to hold to that faith with something less than
righteous enthusiasm.138 Since, 1978, when Congress approved the Ak-Chin Indian
Water Rights Settlement Act,139 the first express settlement of tribal water rights
claims, only forty-four of the more than 560 federally recognized American Indian
tribes have obtained a formal settlement of their claims,140 with twelve settlements
accomplished during the Obama Administration alone.141 This progress marks a
significant collective achievement, but it remains slow work. As the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Committee observed nearly twenty years ago, negotiation
has its own limitations:
[N]egotiated settlements are not an easy solution. They rely on
the willingness of parties to negotiate. Delays and political
maneuvering are often considerable. Settlements generally must
be ratified by the Congress and, in most instances, need judicial
recognition to be effective. Most importantly, settlements
generally rely on large infusions of federal funds to provide
additional water for tribes without damaging the rights of other
water users. Federal budgetary concerns will probably restrict
funding of new water settlements and project-based solutions.
Accordingly, future negotiators will have to be even more
creative.142
The overall pace of settlement seems to justify the Committee’s
cautionary tone and, more dauntingly, suggests—like New Mexico’s former State
Engineer once estimated for his state143—it may take as much as another half a
millennium to resolve the reserved right claims of the more than five hundred

136. Sly, supra note 42.
137. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL & NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, THE IMPORTANCE
OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT FUNDING (2014).
138. Cf. Daniel McCool, Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water Rights: An Assessment of
Negotiated Settlements, 23 PUBLIUS 85, 9293 (1993) (noting lack of methodological assessment of
effectiveness of negotiated settlements in obtaining identified goals).
139. Ak-Chin Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95328, § 1582, 92 Stat. 409 (1978).
140. Charles V. Stern, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44148, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS 6-8
(2015) (tabulating settlements approved by Congress as of that publication date); see also Pub. L. 114322, supra note 28 (including approval of new water settlements relating to the claims of four tribes, i.e.,
Blackfeet Tribe, Chickasaw Nation, Choctaw Nation, and Pechanga Band, while completing steps
necessary for the fulfillment of the prior settlement of the claims addressed in the San Luis Rey Indian
Water Rights Settlement, see infra note 192).
141. U.S. Dep’t of The Interior, SECRETARY JEWELL, TRIBAL LEADERS MARK ENACTMENT OF FOUR
ADDITIONAL WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS FOR INDIAN COUNTRY (2017).
142. Denise Fort et al., WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 349 (1998).
143. See Lucero & Tarlock, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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federally recognized tribes that have not yet converted (or, for many, even yet
stated) their claims. That is a sobering prospect.
Thus, more than a century after the Court decided Winans and Winters, we
find ourselves acknowledging tribal sovereignty and proprietary rights as a general
matter but having produced few specifically-defined and enforceable articulations
of those rights. That lack of finality notwithstanding, tribal and non-tribal
communities, public water suppliers, resource users, and others continue to wrestle
with exigencies driven by shifting use-value priorities, climate variability, and
aging infrastructure—exigencies that demand analysis and decision, even if only
provisionally. This is a circumstance ripe for creative thinking and reform.
III.
A FRAMEWORK FOR WATER PLANNING AS A
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROACH: ITS EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION
IN THE TRIBAL-STATE CONTEXT
Tribal water right litigation and negotiation efforts are fundamentally
organized around that single, practical question: What is the legally actionable
definition of each tribe’s reserved right as applied within a fact pattern that
typically has been shaped by state law normative water right systems and
competing non-tribal legal, equity, and policy interests?144 Answering the question,
though, is not the end itself; the question serves to organize efforts intent on
reconciling competing interests within a framework with which our legal systems
can deal, i.e., rights. Our aspiration in resorting to those mechanisms is to create a
level of certainty that will allow our pursuit of material goals, ideally without
prejudice to or caused by our neighbor, e.g., development of water supplies,
restoration of habitat, support for diverse economic development efforts, etc.
Leaving aside the legal system’s focus on rights and the ultimate requirement for
enforceable finality, water planning efforts are generally driven by the same
aspiration.145 Given the demonstrable limitations of our legal systems for efficiently
achieving the goal, water resource planning appears to be a reasonable
supplemental approach.
A.

Water Planning as an Evolving Resource Management Tool

Water planning has become an increasingly popular tool for assessing
water resource policy and management challenges and options.146 Evolving from an
engineering tool originally used to develop disaggregated, single-purpose
projects,147 water planning today requires an interdisciplinary and comprehensive
approach to address a growing list of scientific, political, and use-value

144. See Greetham, supra note 5 at 599 n.17; McCool, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 3.
146. Craig Bell & Jeff Taylor, WATER LAWS AND POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: A
WESTERN
STATES’
PERSPECTIVE
21
(2008),
http://www.westernstateswater.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/laws-policies-report-final-with-cover-1.pdf; see also Vanessa Cassado-Peréz,
et al., All Over the Map: The Diversity of Western Water Plans, CA. J. OF POL. & POL’Y 7(2) 3 (2015)
(noting that water planning now appears to be predominantly performed by state governments).
147. E.g., Morris, supra note 3, at 120-121 (discussing Gilbert F. White, STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN
WATER MANAGEMENT, 4-5 (1969)).
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uncertainties.148 This evolution in practice and utility demonstrates the plasticity of
the tool itself, suggesting its amenability to adaptation for application to a variety of
fact and policy challenges.
For all their diversity in application,149 today’s water plans fundamentally
involve a uniform set of elements, i.e., a quantitative and qualitative assessment of
available water supplies, a characterization of current and projected future
demands, an analysis of the adequacy of supplies relative to demands, and an
exploration and comparative evaluation of strategic options for closing any
shortfall, as judged against identified policy goals or “performance objectives.”150
Engineering professor Jay Lund notes that building on this common foundation,
water planning can be adapted to specific needs or approaches, including traditional
single-purpose planning, benefit-cost planning, multi-objective planning, and—
most importantly for our purposes—conflict resolution planning.151
Lund describes conflict resolution planning as uniquely serving “to
reconcile individuals or groups with conflicting objectives for water management
to a single plan or plan strategy.”152 He notes these efforts typically occur in a
quasi-adversarial context in which “parties have alternatives to participating in a
formal planning process,” and typically emphasize the value of recruitment, such as
requirements that the participants “communicate, understand, and negotiate.”153
This approach generally invests “considerable emphasis, effort and time . . . to
establish broad confidence and communication in both technical and decisionmaking processes,”154 again emphasizing the need for recruitment of would-be
adversaries to a more collaborative forum. Given the fact-intensive nature of the
planning exercise and the increased prioritization of public engagement, the tool
may even be superior to traditional adversarial modes for certain purposes.
As Schlager and Blomquist argue, adversarial and collaborative modes of
engagement are “‘psychologically incompatible,’” with the former rewarding
“‘strategic, and even opportunistic, communication and withholding of
information—and a good deal of distrust against potential misinformation’”—while
the latter “‘requir[es] creativity, effective communication, and mutual trust.’”155
Given these distinctions between adversarial and collaborative modes,
“[i]nformation asymmetries can contribute to creating an atmosphere of distrust
and deception, discouraging individuals from working together to find outcomes
superior to what they currently achieve.”156 In the tribal-state water conflict

148. Id. at 122; see also Miller, supra note 3, at 395-396.
149. Cassado-Peréz, supra note 145, at 6-14.
150. Jay R. Lund, APPROACHES TO PLANNING WATER RESOURCES 2-3 (Mar. 30, 2006) (unpublished
paper), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralvalley/water_issues/salinity/library_reports_programs/lun
d_water_resource_planning.pdf.; accord Greetham, supra note 5, at 606-607.
151. Lund, supra note 149, at 3, 5-6.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Schlager & Blomquist, supra note 6, at 6-7 (quoting Fritz Scharpf, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY
(1997)).
156. Id. at 7.
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context, political scientist Lloyd Burton similarly observes that the combatants do
not always appear focused on resolution as much as competitive position:
[F]or one or more parties in a dispute, settlement may not be a
primary goal. Indeed, keeping the dispute unsettled, active, off
balance, and costly to all concerned may in some situations be
the preferred strategy. Also, in the disputing process each party
plans and executes strategy to get the dispute into the friendliest
forum under the most favorable conditions possible at the lowest
costs to themselves and the greatest cost to their opponents. In
short, each party tries to manage the dispute (regarding forum,
transaction costs, movement toward or away from settlement, at
so on) to its own advantage.157
Indeed, given the sweeping nature of the issues and history of distrust, relegation of
tribal and state actors to adversarial forums may compound the typical challenges
arising from competition. Certainly Schlager’s, Blomquist’s, and Burton’s
observations echo concerns voiced by the Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Committee twenty years ago.158
Conversely, properly structured opportunities for cooperative fact-finding
and information distribution and analysis outside of or insulated from adversarial
contexts, i.e., properly structured planning exercises, can facilitate breaking down
the distrust and gamesmanship inimical to building consensus and collaboration.159
Admittedly, water planning has no legal force and can provide no enforceable
finality,160 which can serve as a legitimate basis for criticism.161 Critics have also
pointed to the general lack of uniform water planning methodologies as well as
structural challenges to reliable information gathering and implementation.162
These critiques and observations are valid, but they also serve primarily to
underscore the fact that water planning remains an evolving tool, which may be
part of its value—allowing a flexibility to permit locally appropriate exercises in
joint fact finding, issue spotting, and policy debate.163 Indeed, given the burden and
pace of achieving enforceable finality through formal legal mechanisms, the
opportunity for interim or supplemental progress through enhanced
intergovernmental engagement has manifold attractions.
And it is not an entirely new idea. In its 1978 National Indian Water
Policy, the United States Department of the Interior recommended ensuring tribal
157. Burton, supra note 8, at 36.
158. See Fort, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
159. E.g., Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho & Todd Schenk, Collaborative Planning and
Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29-54 (2010)
(discussing the U.S. Department of the Interior’s failure to adhere to specific “best practices” with
respect to, for example, joint fact-finding and group decision making in its effort to implement a
collaborative adaptive management program among diverse water resource interests and stakeholders).
160. Cassado-Peréz, supra note 145, at 18.
161. Lucero & Tarlock, supra note 132, at 823.
162. Cassado-Peréz, supra note 145, at 18; see also Bell & Taylor, supra at note 144, at 22-24
(discussing criticisms made of water planning in New Mexico and California as well as watershed
planning, in general).
163. Susskind, supra note 158, at 2-3; Lund, supra note 149, at 5-6.
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participation in water resource planning development and making federal technical
resources available for such purposes.164 While this policy was never fully
implemented, federal technical resources are available to tribes for purposes of
water development planning,165 which tribes have used to deepen capacities for
water resources assessments and to develop and implement supply and restoration
projects.166 However, the skepticism that tends to affect tribal regard for legal
processes167 can tend also to adversely impact tribal willingness to engage in
intergovernmental planning efforts; as tribal planner Sharon Hausam puts it,
“[a]fter centuries of being excluded, ignored, or misunderstood in decision-making
processes, it is reasonable to doubt that regional planning might be an
improvement.”168 Hausam’s comments help to re-ground discussion of engagement
efforts in the same history that contributes to the complexities affecting tribal-state
water conflict generally.169
B.

State Water Planning and Tribal Engagement: Experiences in California,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma

As water management challenges have continued and compounded, states
increasingly have turned to water planning to build support for initiatives and to
better inform management decisions.170 However, the question remains, how well
have they fared in engaging tribes in state water planning efforts? The next section
examines the experience in three states that seem so far to have made the most
effort in this regard: California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
Collectively, these three states have 171 federally recognized American
Indian tribes within their borders—nearly a third of all federally recognized tribal
governments throughout the United States.171 Among them, however each differs
164. Thomas W. Fredericks, Developing a National Indian Water Rights Policy, in BEST PRACTICES
FOR PROTECTING NATURAL RESOURCES ON TRIBAL LANDS 1, 19-20 (Aspatore, 2016).
165. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Water Resources,
https://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/NaturalResources/Water/index.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2017); U.S. Geological Survey, USGS and Tribes Work Together to Gain Water Knowledge,
https://water.usgs.gov/coop/tribes_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); U.S. Geological Survey, PNW
Tribal Water Resources Assessment, https://wa.water.usgs.gov/projects/pnwtribal/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2017); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Native American Affairs, https://www.usbr.gov/native/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017).
166. See, e.g., Office of the Tribal Water Engineer Eastern Shoshone & Northern Arapahoe Tribes,
Drought Mitigation Plan, http://wrir.wygisc.org/content/drought-mitigation-plan (last visited Jan. 18,
2017); Spokane Tribe, Water and Fish Program, http://www.spokanetribe.com/dnr-water (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017); CPN Public Information Office, CPN Water Plan an Example for Oklahoma Tribes,
CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, Feb. 26, 2013 (on file with author).
167. See Pisani, supra note 57 and accompanying text; Berkey, supra note 57 and accompanying
text; Burton, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
168. Sharon Hausam, MAYBE, MAYBE NOT: NATIVE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL
PLANNING, IN RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS PLANNING 162, 169 (Ted Jojola, et al. eds., 2013).
169. See, e.g., supra notes 32-76 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Meghan Leemon, Western Water Planning Processes: Lessons for Colorado, 17 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 368, 368 (2014) (noting that “[i]n the west, Arizona, Colorado, and Washington
are the only states without comprehensive water plans”); see also Bell &Taylor, supra at note 145, at 22.
171. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016); See also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
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from the other with respect to tribal populations and land bases. For example, less
than one percent of California’s land base is formally recognized as tribal land,172
much of which is isolated or otherwise extensively checker-boarded; while a
greater percentage of lands within Oklahoma are tribally held,173 those lands, too,
are largely checker-boarded and non-contiguous. In contrast, nearly eleven percent
of lands within New Mexico is tribally held,174 much of it in substantially
contiguous parcels.
These variations in size and degree of contiguity contribute to
jurisdictional and land ownership diversities that can pose different challenges to
water resource management efforts. Each state also varies in its demographics. As
indicated in Figure 1, the non-Hispanic white population makes up only a large
plurality in California and New Mexico while such population is the significant
majority in Oklahoma. Meanwhile, the American Indian population of California is
only one percent of the state’s total population, less than the national proportion of
one and one-fifth percent,175 while New Mexico and Oklahoma have American
Indian populations of approximately nine percent, each.

Fig. 1 - State Population Demographics170F
State
California
New Mexico
Oklahoma

Total population

American
Indian only

Non-Hispanic
white only

Hispanic only

37,254,522
2,059,198
3,751,351

1.0%
9.4%
8.6%

40.1%
40.5%
68.7%

37.6%
46.3%
8.9%

176

These demographics reflect each states’ varied ethnic, cultural, and legal
histories, all of which impacts their particular relations with the American Indian
tribes within their borders. With this as background, the following discussion
examines each of these state’s individual efforts to engage tribes in their water plan
efforts.

LEGISLATURES, FEDERAL AND STATE RECOGNIZED TRIBES (Oct. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribes.aspx .
172. U.S.
Forest
Serv.,
Appendix
D:
Indian
Nations
D-3
(1990)
https://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. (Of California’s total land base, 520,049 acres are tribal
lands, 66,769 are individually allotted tribal lands, and 808 acres are other federal-tribal lands).
173. See Id. (illustrating that of Oklahoma’s land base, 96,839 acres are held by tribes, 1,000,165
acres are allotted lands, and 2,298 acres are other federal-tribal lands, for an overall share of 2.5%).
174. See Id. (illustrating that of New Mexico’s land base, 7,252,326 acres are tribal lands, 630,293
are individually allotted lands, and 270,276 are other federal-tribal lands).
175. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: UNITED STATES, (2010), https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00.
176. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: CA, (2010), http://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/table/PST045216/06; See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: NM, (2010)
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/35; See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS:
OKLA., (2010) http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/40.
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California

The United States’ possession of California began with the signing of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 at the close of the Mexican-American War.177
As the ink was drying on that treaty, gold was discovered at Sutter’s Mill,
“prompting a huge influx of Americans seeking their fortunes” and violent conflict
between the new migrants, who were backed by the United States military, and the
indigenous American Indian peoples who resisted displacement.178 Of this period
of violence and dispossession, California historian Hubert Bancroft said, “[i]t was
one of the last human hunts of civilization, and the basest and most brutal of them
all.”179 While the federal government made preliminary efforts to secure treaties
with the tribes of the region, California’s objection to tribal land assignments and
reservations scuttled the enterprise.180 Meanwhile, the California government
enacted and implemented laws to effect the disenfranchisement of tribal peoples
and expedite the expropriation of tribal resources.181 As a result, tribal populations
and holdings were decimated, leaving the vast majority of American Indians
“landless” by the dawn of the Twentieth Century.182 Federal efforts between 1906
and 1934 made some progress in restoring lands and otherwise supporting tribal
populations,183 but the explosion of California settlement was disastrous for American
Indian tribes. Legal scholar Carol Goldberg and sociologist Duane Champagne
make the point that, following the gold rush era and “[t]hroughout much of the
Twentieth Century, California Indians have been administratively, culturally,
economically, and politically disadvantaged, even compared with tribes elsewhere
in the United States.”184
During this same period of time, the United States responded to local
agricultural producers’ call for the development of massive water infrastructure—
resulting in the Central Valley Project, a quintessential Bureau of Reclamation
project.185 As historian Donald Worster argues, the Central Valley Project was not
only instrumental in engineering water resources in support of epically scaled
California agricultural development, it also served to mature the Bureau of
Reclamation into “the technical master of water in the richest agricultural region on

177. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, , 9 Stat. 922.
178. Veronica E. Velarde Tiller, TILLER’S GUIDE TO INDIAN COUNTRY: ECONOMIC PROFILES OF
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 359-60 (2005). Accord COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.03[5], at 58
(“The discovery of gold in California transformed the non-Indian migration westward into a
stampede.”).
179. Hubert Howe Bancroft, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA: VOL. VII, 1860-1890 474 (1890).
180. COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.03[5], at 58-59.
181. See An Act for the Government and Protection of Indians, 1850 Cal. Stat. 408-10 (1850); );
Kimberly Johnston-Dodds, Early California Laws and Policies Related to California Indians, Cal. Res.
Bureau, CRB-02-014, at 5 (2002), https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/02/14/02-014.pdf, (“The 1850 Act
and subsequent amendments facilitated removing California Indians from their traditional lands,
separating at least a generation of children and adults from their families, languages, and cultures (1850
to 1865), and indenturing Indian children and adults to Whites.”)
182. Tiller, supra note 177, at 360; Accord COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.03[5] at 59.
183. Id.
184. Goldberg and Champagne, supra note 72, at 44.
185. C.f., Reisner, supra note 21, at 9-10.
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earth . . . the indispensable partner of western industrial farming.”186 In other
words, through building some of the West’s most storied water infrastructure,
California proved to be the incubator of the federal government’s primary western
water developer.
Today, California has within its borders 109 federally recognized
American Indian tribes and several other federally unrecognized tribal
communities.187 Few of these tribes have significant contiguous land holdings, and
poverty and limited access to infrastructure continue to pose challenges for the
health and stability of many tribal communities.188 At the same, some tribes located
near urban centers have been able to capitalize on gaming,189 which has had
significant positive local and statewide economic impact.190 Perhaps more
importantly, success in economic development has provided means for
strengthening tribal institutions and potentially enhancing the exercise of tribal
sovereignty in an intergovernmental context.191
California has a comprehensive water law system, which includes
provisions for the conduct of stream adjudications,192 and has secured water rights
settlements with several American Indian tribes, i.e., the La Jolla, Ricon, San
Pasquale, Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians,193 the Pechanga Band,194 and
the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians.195 Through its Water Resources Control
Board, the state also develops a comprehensive statewide water plan196 and
provides financial, technical resources, and facilitation services support to regional
water planning efforts.197 And in recent years, the state has made significant tribal
outreach efforts.198

186. See Donald Worster, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 256 (1985).
187. See supra note 170.
188. E.g., Advisory Council on California Indian Policy, THE ACCIP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES OF CONCERN TO INDIANS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1997).
189. Id.; see also Mark Fogarty, “California Controls 25 Percent of All Indian Gaming Revenues,”
Indian Country Media Network (Mar. 25, 2016) (on file with author). Indeed, modern tribal gaming can
be said to have originated among California tribes. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202 (1987) (preempting state effort to shut down tribal gaming operation conducted on tribal
lands).
190. California Tribal Gaming Impact Study, AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF TRIBAL GAMING
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS, WITH EXPANDED STUDY OF RSTF AND CHARITABLE EFFECTS,
(Beacon Economics, LLC ed. 2014), https://cniga.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EIS-Final-2014.pdf.
191. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 72, at 57-59 (“The California tribes’ political battle over
gaming also created an economic base that makes it easier to implement their sovereignty, establishing
sovereign realities “on the ground” that change options for both state and federal governments.”).
192. See Cal. Water Code §§ 2000-2900 (1943); See, e.g., Decree, In re Determination of Rights to
the Waters of the Scott River Sys., No. 30,662 (Cal. App. Dep’t Sup. Ct. Jan. 16, 1980).
193. San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-675, 102 Stat. 4000 (1998);
see also San Luis Rey Settlement Agreement Implementation, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 3605 (2016);
Supra note 28.
194. See Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, supra note 28, §§ 3401-02.
195. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians Settlement Act, Pub. L. 110-297, 122 Stat. 2975 (2008).
196. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10000-10013 (West 2017).
197. See id. § 10013; Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Integrated Regional Water Management, http://www.
water.ca.gov/irwm/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2017); Tom J. Lutterman, P.G., & Scott D. Woodland, P.E.,
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Early in the state’s outreach efforts, California water law practitioner
Curtis Berkey made the case that Indian tribes “acknowledge that California’s
water planning process may present an opportunity for collaboration in devising
water management plans that protect tribal resources and foster cooperation
between Tribes and their neighbors,” but are “too often seen as merely part of the
general public, rather than sovereign entities with enforceable water rights under
federal law.”199 He pointed to the Coachella Valley Water District’s local water
plan, for example, and explained it “contains no evidence that Indian Tribes were
consulted in its formulation,” notwithstanding the district’s inclusion of four Indian
reservations comprised of nearly 50,000 acres.200 As he suggested, this omission
appears conscious, since the plan admitted it made “no distinctions among ‘Indian
trust assets and other lands within District boundaries.’”201 Berkey contrasted this
approach with that of the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board,
which was “making efforts to include Indian Tribes within that region in
development of a water quality restoration plan for the Klamath River Basin, and
has held at least one hearing on an Indian reservation affected by the plan.”202
Berkey’s focus on the Coachella District’s omission may have been prescient; four
years after he made his case, the district was sued by the Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians, which has successfully asserted reserved rights to the
groundwaters of the Coachella Valley.203
Berkey suggested several factors that may contribute to the “near
invisibility of Indian Tribes in state and regional water planning,”204 including the
legal and political complexities of the issues, the history of distrust and hostility
among the parties, and the absence of state statute obligating state agency
consideration of tribal rights and interests.205 However, California’s efforts in
recent years indicate it is taking serious steps toward ameliorating some of those
concerns.206
For example, in 2009, California formed a Tribal Communications
Committee “to advise the California Department of Water Resources on how to

Regional Services: Technical Services Facilitation Services Regional Coordination, Cal. Dep’t of Water
Res. (n.d.), http://water.ca.gov/irwm/archives/docs/partnership/Module%202A_IRWM%20Regional
%20Services.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). California also requires the development of Urban Water
Management Planning Act. Id. §§ 10610,-10610.4.
198. E.g., Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., California Water Plan Tribal Water Summit, ca.gov
http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/tribal/tws/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). California water
plan documents are generally available at http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan.
199. Berkey, supra note 5, at 1, 3.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water Dist., et al., Civ. No. 13-883 (C.D. Cal., May 14, 2013); Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., et al., 849 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. filed July 7, 2017) (No. 17-42).
204. Berkey, supra note 5, at 3.
205. Id. at 2-3.
206. E.g., Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., CAL. WATER PLAN 2013 UPDATE Vol. 1, Ch. 4, at 4-20 to 4-22,
http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/docs/cwpu2013/Final/05_Vol1_Ch04_Strengthening_Gov_Align.pdf.
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better contact, and communicate with, the more than 160 Native American Tribes
in California.”207 In that first effort, twenty-seven Tribal representatives
participated in the formulation of a written tribal communication plan.208 That same
year, the first Tribal Water Summit was held under the water plan’s auspices to
provide a forum for relevant discussion and to facilitate coordination of tribal input.
(It was in this forum that Berkey presented his paper.)209 The summit produced a
detailed set of Recommended Actions for Addressing California Native American
Tribal Water Issues,210 and thereafter, California took a series of responsive actions
designed to increase government-to-government tribal-state engagement, including:






the formation of a Tribal Advisory Committee, apparently supported by
direct outreach to tribal leaders;211
the establishment of a California Water Plan’s Tribal Advisory Committee
and establishment of the group’s charter;212
Governor Brown’s issuance of Executive Order B-10-11, which provided
that “it is the policy of this Administration that every state agency and
department subject to my executive control shall encourage
communication and consultation with California Indian Tribes” and
“permit elected officials and other representatives of tribal governments to
provide meaningful input into the development of legislation, regulations,
rules, and policies on matters that may affect tribal communities;”213 and
pursuant to the governor’s executive order, the creation of the Governor’s
Tribal Advisor Office, which reports directly to the state’s chief executive
with respect to oversight and implementation of “effective government-togovernment consultation between the Governor’s Administration and
California Tribes on policies that affect California tribal communities.”214

As of 2013, the California Water Plan Tribal Advisory Committee
included representation from forty state and federally recognized tribes (15%), plus

207. Cal. Water Plan Tribal Water Summit, supra note 197. See id. (including within its count of
tribes state as well as federally recognized tribes); see also id. at 4-20 (discussing plan’s definition of
“Native American Tribe”).
208. See Tribal Commc’n Comm. (TCC), Tribal Communication Plan (Working Draft) 27 (Summer
2008), www.vision.ca.gov/docs/Tribal_Comms_Plan.pdf.
209. See Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Cal. Water Plan Tribal Water Summit (2009), http://www.water.
ca.gov/waterplan/docs/tws/CTWS_ProceedingsFull_v2df_02-08-10.pdf.
210. Cal. Tribal Water Summit Planning Team, Recommended Actions for Addressing Cal. Native
Am.
Tribal
Water
Issues
(Feb.
8,
2010),
http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/d
ocs/tws/CTWS_SummitNextStepsSorted_v7df_02-08-10.pdf.
211. Letter from Calif. Dep’t of Water Resources Director Mark Cowin to “Dear Sir or Madam”
(Nov.15,2010), http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/docs/tribal_engagement/inviteletter_tribalorganization.pdf.

212. Cal. Water Plan Tribal Advisory Comm. Group Charter (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.water.ca.gov/waterplan/docs/tac/Final_TribalACCharter.pdf.
213. Calif. Exec. Ord. No. B-10-11 (Sept. 19, 2011),https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17223.
214. Governor’s Tribal Advisor Office, ca.gov, http://tribalgovtaffairs.ca.gov/.
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two additional tribal organizations,215 and in April of that year, the second Tribal
Water Summit was held, organized primarily by tribal representatives.216 The
Proceedings from these summits suggest a significant level of substantive tribal
engagement.217
The 2013 update to the California Water Plan emphasized three
fundamental policy goals: commitment to integrated water management,
strengthening of government agency alignment, and investment in innovation and
infrastructure.218 Notably, the state policy goal of engagement and collaboration
with tribal governments is woven throughout the plan’s call for strengthening of
government agency alignment, generally.219 Meanwhile the California Water Plan
Tribal Advisory Committee is preparing for the 2018 plan update.220
2.

New Mexico

Like California, the United States’ possession of New Mexico began at the
end of the Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.221 While
the United States’ acquisition and establishment of the New Mexico Territory
triggered its citizens’ increased migration to the region, it was not nearly the
stampede occasioned by the California gold rush.222 During this period, the United
States surveyed and confirmed American Indian tribal land title previously vested
under Spanish and Mexican law,223 offering basic protection for some tribal
property interests and some stability in the early development of the region.
However, the sovereign status of the individual tribal collectives and their relation
to the federal common law of Indian affairs was not established until statehood,224
which led to interim confusion regarding certain land transactions.225 Still, such
tribal status and land bases were confirmed within twenty years of statehood, and
the federal law’s protection of the rights and powers incident thereto has likewise

215. See CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIF. WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013: TRIBAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE MEMBER LIST (2013); see also CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIF. WATER PLAN
UPDATE 2013 TRIBAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2011-PRESENT (2014).
216. See CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN TRIBAL WATER SUMMIT
PROCEEDINGS 7-8 (2013).
217. See Id.
218. See CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013 INTEGRATED
WATER MANAGEMENT: PRESENTATION TO CALIF. WATER COMM’N, 11 (2013).
219. E.g., Id. at 10; see also CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIF. WATER PLAN 2013 UPDATE:
STRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT ALIGNMENT, supra note 205.
220. See, e.g., CALIF. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2018: TRIBAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ORIENTATION WEBINAR (Oct. 19, 2016).
221. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 176.
222. See generally, supra note 177-78 and accompanying text.
223. See e.g., Act of July 22, 1854, ch.103, 10 Stat. 308 (1854) (appointing surveyor for evaluation
of pre-treaty land claims); Act of December 22, 1858, chap. 5, 11 Stat. 374 (1858) (recognizing multiple
Pueblo land grants); Act of February 9, 1869, ch. 26, 15 Stat. 438 (1869 (recognizing additional grant);
Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 438, 46 Stat. 1509 (1931) (same).
224. See U.S. v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1876); U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 36-49 (1913).
225. See e.g., Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (Jun. 7, 1924); Pueblo Compensation
Act of 1933, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108 (May 31, 1933).
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long been affirmed.226 Today, while challenges remain, the tribes in New Mexico
have reclaimed their collective position as a significant part of the region’s
economy, particularly with respect to tribal gaming;227 meanwhile the State of New
Mexico has evolved over the decades has developed a culturally diverse, fiscally
conservative, and generally socially tolerant political atmosphere.228
New Mexico, situated in the high plains desert of the American southwest,
has a long history of water rights litigation and negotiation. Three of its oldest
stream adjudications—the Lewis adjudication initiated in the 1956,229 the Aamodt
adjudication initiated in 1966,230 and the Abeyta adjudication initiated in 1969231—
are generations old and have each produced decrees of tribal water rights; in fact, of
the twenty-three American Indian tribes with lands in New Mexico,232 eight have
obtained final and enforceable declarations of their water rights through either
litigation233 or negotiated settlement.234 As already noted, the unique complexities
of Pueblo water rights have so far hindered the development of a uniform standard
for defining those rights,235 but New Mexico has nonetheless established a fairly
successful, if slow,236 tradition of handling tribal water rights matters within
traditional adversarial processes. It has also long worked to engage tribal
governments in regular water planning efforts.237
New Mexico’s Office of the State Engineer (OSE) and its Interstate
Stream Commission (Commission) produced New Mexico’s first statewide water
plan in 2003238 and, since then, have produced updates every five years.239 The

226. See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1976).
227. See Thaddieus W. Conner and William A. Taggart, The Impact of Gaming on the Indian
Nations in New Mexico, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 50 (2009).
228. See Marilyn C. O’Leary, Water Planning in New Mexico: Enigma, Paradox or Pattern?, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVT’L L. 343, 346-47 (2004).
229. State ex rel. State Engineer v. Lewis, 1973-NMSC-035, 508 P.2d 577.
230. N.M. ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985).
231. Procedural and Scheduling Order for Review of Proposed Settlement Agreement and Partial
Final Judgement Rights of Taos Pueblo at 8, N.M. ex rel State Engineer v. Abeyta, 6:69-CV-07896-MV
(D.N.M. 2013).
232. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019-23 (Jan. 29, 2016).
233. State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 1993-NMCA-063, 116 N.M. 194, 861 P.2d 235 (1993)
(decreeing water rights for the Mescalero Apache Tribe).
234. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064 (providing for the
settlement of water rights claimed, respectively, by the Navajo Nation and the Pueblos of Nambé,
Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, Taos, and Tesuque); Jicarilla Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No.
102-441, 106 Stat. 2237 (providing for the settlement of water rights claimed by the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe).
235. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
236. Lucero & Tarlock, supra note. 132.
237. NMSA 1978 §§ 72-14-3.1(J) (2003); 72-14-44(B) (1987).
238. Interstate Stream Commission, NEW MEXICO STATE WATER PLAN: WORKING TOGETHER
TOWARDS OUR WATER FUTURE (Dec. 23, 2003), http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Planning/SWP/
PDF/2003StateWaterPlan.pdf, (hereinafter, “NM 2003 Plan.”).
239. Interstate Stream Commission, WORKING TOWARD SOLUTIONS: INTEGRATING OUR WATER
AND OUR ECONOMY, STATE WATER PLAN 2013 REVIEW (2013) [hereinafter NM 2013 Plan Review];
Interstate Stream Commission, REVIEW AND PROPOSED UPDATE N.M. STATE WATER PLAN (June 2008)
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state developed the narrative substance of its first plan through extensive public
input, including twenty-nine public meetings in which approximately 1,500
individuals participated,240 the plan offered the following declaration:
The [Commission and OSE] shall consult directly with the
governments of Indian nations, tribes and pueblos to formulate a
statement of policy and process to guide: (1) coordination or
integration of the water plans of Indian nations, tribes and
pueblos located wholly or partially within New Mexico with the
state water plan; and (2) final adjudication or settlement of all
water rights claims by Indian nations, tribes and pueblos located
wholly or partially within New Mexico.241
This declaration is now included in New Mexico’s water law statutes.242
Contemporaneous with this declaration, New Mexico took steps to
formalize mechanisms for intergovernmental tribal-state engagement and
collaboration. The first step, in 2003, was Governor Bill Richardson’s uniting of
leaders from tribes throughout the state to sign a joint Statement of Policy and
Process to, among other things, “establish and promote a relationship of
cooperation, coordination, open communication and good will, and work in good
faith to amicably and fairly resolve issues and differences.”243 Two years later,
Governor Richardson issued Executive Order 2005-004, relating to the Statewide
Adoption of Tribal Consultation Plans.244 Finally in 2009, New Mexico enacted its
State-Tribal Collaboration Act, which directed the establishment of tribal liaison
positions in each agency of state government, the training of state employees in
cultural competencies, and the development of state-tribal communication and
collaboration policies and capacities.245 In short, during this relatively short period
of time, New Mexico took several specific and concrete actions to develop and
refine its ability to engage directly and in a government-to-government capacity
with American Indian tribes located within its borders.
Meanwhile, in its 2013 Plan Review, the Commission and OSE provided a
substantive update on the progress of tribal-state engagement, reporting that long[hereinafter NM 2008 Review]. New Mexico water plan documents are generally available at
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Planning/.
240. O’Leary, supra note 227, at 345.
241. NM 2003 Plan, supra note 237, Sec. E at 73. The statement expands on this policy declaration
to include statements that the state water planning process “will not limit Pueblo or Tribal water
claims,” that the state will engage in good faith on a “government-to-government” basis, and that the
state recognizes the unique cultural importance of water to American Indian communities and the
paramount importance of tribal sovereignty. Id.
242. NMSA 1978, § 72-14-3.1(E) (2003).
243. STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCESS (Jan. 17, 2003), https://www.env.nm.gov/OOTS/Trib
al_Liaison/statement_pp.pdf.
244. STATEWIDE ADOPTION OF TRIBAL CONSULTATION PLANS (Feb. 1, 2005), http://archives.
elpalacio.org/cdm/ref/collection/p267801coll5/id/2634; see generally, Richard Nichols and George
Colyer, PILOT TRIBAL CONSULTATION EFFORTS BY THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO: STUDY OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 2005-004, (Jun. 2009), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/American-Indian-Alaska-Native/AIAN/Downloads/Pilot-Tribal-Consultation-Efforts-by-theState-of-New-Mexico.pdf.
245. NMSA 1978, §§ 11-18-1 to -5 (2009).
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standing efforts to achieve negotiated water right settlements with the Navajo
Nation and the Pueblos of Nambe, Taos, Tesuque, Pojoaque, and San Ildefonso had
been successful since the 2003 plan’s release.246 The agencies also reported that the
New Mexico Legislature had recently enacted the Indian Water Rights Settlement
Fund and appropriated $35 million toward the three tribal water settlements.247
Finally, though less remarkably, the agencies reported that they had “met with the
Tribes, Pueblos and Nations in public meetings over the course of the past ten years
to address water planning goals. All the parties involved have a strong commitment
to create a mutually agreeable statement of policy and process to guide
coordination and integration of the water plan.”248
In addition to its statewide plan, New Mexico conducts regional water
planning, which provides tribe-specific engagement data.249 The Commission
generally provides central oversight and guidance, while “self-defined water
planning regions” perform data collection and water planning strategy
prioritization.250 The regional process emphasizes the value of public engagement
but provides that “the extent and nature of public involvement in the regional water
planning process is the prerogative of each region . . . .”251
As to tribal engagement, the Commission’s regional planning handbook
offers:
Indian tribes and pueblos are a key stakeholder group in New
Mexico. The [Commission] has a tribal liaison and conducts
periodic tribal summits on water resource issues. The state and
the regions will encourage tribal participation in the regional and
state water plan updates. However, the state respects tribal
sovereignty and will abide by tribal decisions regarding the
extent of their participation in the process.252
Of New Mexico’s sixteen planning regions, seven (44%) included significant tribal
lands and waters, and a review of the 2016 regional plan updates253 indicates

246. NM 2013 Plan Review, supra note 237, at 26-27.
247. Id. at 28.
248. Id.; see generally Nichols & Colyer, supra note 243.
249. NMSA 1978, § 72-14-43 and -44 (2007).
250. John R. Brown, ”Whisky’s Fer Drinkin’; Water’s Fer Fightin’!” Is it? Resolving a Collective
Action Dilemma in New Mexico, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 185, 194-95 (2003). New Mexico’s planning
regions are based on a blended consideration of the natural and the political, i.e., “[a] water planning
region . . . is an area within the state that contains sufficient hydrological and political interests in
common to make water planning feasible.” NMSA 1978, § 72-14-44(D) (1987).
251. New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission, UPDATED REGIONAL WATER PLANNING
HANDBOOK: GUIDELINES TO PREPARING UPDATES TO NEW MEXICO REGIONAL WATER PLANS 5 (Dec.
13, 2015).
252. Id. at 7.
253. See generally, Regional Water Planning, http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Planning/regio
nal_planning.php.

Winter 2018

WATER PLANNING

37

consistent efforts to integrate tribal voices and issues—an effort regional planners
appear focused on continuing to evaluate and potentially improve.254
For example, as tabulated in Figure 2, six (86%) of the seven water
planning regions included representation from tribal governments on their steering
committees, and the seventh indicated that tribal leaders had been invited but did
not report participation. Of the twenty-three tribes in New Mexico, ten (43%)
participated through appointees to regional planning steering committees, with four
(17%) participating in multiple regions.255 Thirteen (57%) appear not to have
participated in any regional planning body.256

Fig. 2 - New Mexico Planning Regions
Planning Region
Region 2 (San Juan)
Region 3 (Jemez y Sangre)
Region 6 (Northwest New Mexico)
Region 7 (Taos)
Region 10 (Lower Pecos)
Region 12 (Middle Rio Grande)
Region 14 (Rio Chama)

No. of Tribes
Within Region
3
8
4
2
1
12
2

No. of Tribes on
Steering
C 1i
3
4
0
1
2
2

Tribal Participation
Rate
33%
38%
100%
0%
100%
17%
100%

As to the relationship between participation in water planning and
traditional adversarial processes, there seems little relationship. For example, seven
(70%) of the ten tribes that participated in regional water planning are also party to
ongoing stream adjudications,257 of the five non-participating tribes that are already
party to ongoing stream adjudications, three (60%) are party to the same case,258
which may suggest the possibility of a cause specific to that proceeding, and one
254. N.M. Reg’l Water Plan. Governance Study Grp., Tribal Participation: Draft (2015),
http://www.waterassembly.org/Archives/Water%20Assembly%20Documents/GSG06bTribal%20Participation.pdf. (evaluating and proposing reforms to state’s outreach efforts).
255. See 2016 Regional Planning Reports, supra note 252, Navajo Nation participated in Regions 2
and 6, appearing not to have participated in Region 12; Jicarilla Nation participated in Region 14,
appearing not to have participated in Regions 2 and 12; Santa Clara Pueblo participated in Regions 3
and 14, appearing not to have participated in Region 12; Laguna Pueblo participated in Regions 6 and
12; Pojoaque and Tesuque Pueblos participated in Region 3; Acoma and Zuni Pueblos participated in
Region 6; Mescalero Apache Nation participated in Region 10; and Sandia Pueblo participated in
Region 12.
256. See id. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Ohkay Owingeh, Cochiti Pueblo, Kewa, Nambe Pueblo, San
Ildefonso Pueblo, Taos Pueblo, Picuris Pueblo, Isleta Pueblo, Jemez Pueblo, San Felipe Pueblo, Santa
Ana Pueblo, and Zia Pueblo.
257. See id. Acoma Pueblo, Jicarilla Nation, Laguna Pueblo, Mescalero Apache Tribe, Navajo
Nation, Santa Clara Pueblo, and Zuni Tribe, though two of these tribes (Jicarilla and Mescalero) have
already obtained a decree of rights.
258. See id. Jemez Pueblo, Santa Ana Pueblo, and Zia Pueblo, each of whom is a claimant in the
Jemez adjudication, New Mexico, ex rel. State Engineer v. Abousleman, et al., 83cv01041 (D.N.M. July
5, 2012).
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(20%) has very limited land holdings in New Mexico,259 with the majority of its
lands lying within Colorado’s borders, which suggests tribal priorities may lie
north of the state line. Furthermore, while it may be a safe assumption that
participation in an active adjudication would dissuade a tribe from engagement in
collaborative water planning, three (23%) of the non-participating tribes are party
to completed water right settlements that resolved their water right claims,260 a
status that should reduce perception and concern of legal risk associated with
intergovernmental cooperative engagement. Admitting that this is a small sample
size, these numbers do not suggest any clear correlation between participation in
regional water planning and participation in active litigation or formal negotiations;
whether to participate or not in planning efforts seems a decision made without
necessary regard to prior or contemporaneous participation in litigation or
negotiation efforts.
Finally, each of the 2016 regional planning reports include discussions of
applicable tribal water codes and water quality standards applicable to water use
within their boundaries—discussing, for example, the Jicarilla Nation’s water code
as well as its water and wastewater utility codes and water quality standards
promulgated by seven tribes.
3.

Oklahoma

The United States acquired the lands that now comprise Oklahoma as part
of the Louisiana Purchase,261 a portion of which was set aside from the public
domain for purposes of implementing President Andrew Jackson’s Indian removal
policies.262 During the pre-statehood period, tens of thousands of American Indians
were forcibly removed from their aboriginal homelands, effectuating the near
complete ethnic cleansing of the United States east of the Mississippi as tribes were
relocated to treaty lands in what was loosely denominated Indian Territory.263
Those tribes were not long alone in their new homelands, however.
Following the American Civil War, American expansion came to Indian
Territory.264 Expedited by post-war enthusiasm for western development and new
treaties that allowed the railroads access to tribal lands,265 American Indians were

259. See id. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, which is primarily located within the borders of Colorado.
260. See id. Nambé Pueblo, San Ildefonso Pueblo, and Taos Pueblo.
261. E.g., Louisiana Purchase, http://www.historynet.com/louisiana-purchase (last visited Sept. 8,
2017).
262. COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.03[4][a], at 31.
263. Id. at 44-51(discussing legal history of President Jackson’s removal policy, concluding “by
1850, the majority of Indian tribes had been removed from the eastern states.”); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 622-27 (1970) (discussing removal treaties, Indian Territory, and formation of
the State of Oklahoma). See generally, e.g., Amanda L. Paige, et al., CHICKASAW REMOVAL 23-70
(2010); see also, L. Susan Work, THE SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA: A LEGAL HISTORY 3-4
(2010).
264. See David A. Nichols, LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS: CIVIL WAR POLICY AND POLITICS 204-06
(U. of Mo. Press 1978) (discussing post-war initiation of federal efforts to set up centralized territorial
government in Indian Territory).
265. Id. at 163-64; see also COHEN’S, supra note 2, § 1.03[8]; BLUE CLARK, INDIAN TRIBES OF
OKLAHOMA: A GUIDE 13 (U. of Okla. Press: Norman 2009); Daniel F. Littlefield, The Chickasaw
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soon overwhelmed by non-Indian migrants. Within the first decade of the new
century, Congress again imposed and coerced the dismantlement of tribal treaty
homelands to make way for Oklahoma’s entry as the forty-sixth state,266 a process
that included massive government-sponsored land runs that facilitated an
overwhelming inflow of non-tribal settlement.267 The establishment of the State of
Oklahoma seems to have been contemporaneously presumed to have effectuated
the erasure of the tribal communities and systems on which it was superimposed,268
and as a result of the policies attendant to that goal, tribal peoples were reduced to a
remarkable level of poverty and disenfranchisement under new state law systems.
As Oklahoma historian Angie Debo observed in 1951 with respect to the Five
Tribes of eastern Oklahoma, “they were protected theoretically by laws and courts,
which they did not understand and could not use; actually the whole legal system of
Eastern Oklahoma was warped to strip them of their property”269 as result, “[t]hese
Indians, who less than fifty years ago owned half of what is now the state of
Oklahoma, live in appalling poverty.”270
But the later decades of the Twentieth Century saw a remarkable
resurgence of tribal governance in Oklahoma.271 Beginning with the American
Civil Rights movement, grassroots tribal leaders emerged to reorganize efforts to
take back control of tribal assets and rebuild tribal institutions.272 Among other
successes, these efforts led to the enactment of the Principal Chiefs Act,273 which
ended federal law limitations on tribal selection of leaders of Oklahoma tribes, and
to litigation that culminated in the revitalization of pre-statehood tribal
constitutionssources of organic tribal national sovereignty that survived
Oklahoma statehood.274 Today, thirty-eight federally recognized American Indian
tribes are located within Oklahoma’s borders,275 many of whom have helped
establish a regionally robust gaming economy, resulting in tribal governments
serving collectively as a major economic engine in modern Oklahoma, particularly
its rural areas.276

Freedmen: A People Without A Country, in CONTRIBUTIONS IN AFRO-AMERICAN AND AFRICAN
STUDIES No. 54, at 40-45 (Greenwood Press 1980).
266. Proclamation No. 780 (Nov.16, 1907).
267. E.g., W. David Baird and Danney Goble, OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 141-48 (U. of Okla. Press:
Norman 2008).
268. See, e.g., Last Indian Legislation, Chickasaw Legislature Has Held Last Session, DAILY
ARDMOREITE Sept. 16, 1907, at 1 (describing dismantlement of tribal government on eve of Oklahoma
statehood).
269. Angie Debo, THE INDIAN RTS. ASS’N., THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA: REPORT ON
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 1 (1951).
270. Id. at 4.
271. E.g., Clark, supra note 264, at 16-17.
272. E.g., Phillip Carroll Morgan, CHICKASAW RENAISSANCE 96-109 (Chicksaw Press 2010).
273. An Act to authorize each of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma to popularly select their
principal officer, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 91-495, 84 Stat. 1091.
274. See Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
275. Steven C. Agee, Okla. City U. Econ. Res. & Pol’y Inst., THE STATEWIDE IMPACTS OF
OKLAHOMA TRIBES 3 (2012).
276. Id.at 3; Catherine Sweeney, Tribes provide counties, towns with money for roads, internet
access, THE JOURNAL RECORD, Jan. 25, 2017, at 1.; Report: Oklahoma tribes paid state $1.123 billion
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Meanwhile, Oklahoma’s mechanisms for tribal-state relations regarding
water are uncertain. As a general matter, the state governor, whose staff includes a
statutorily designated Native American Liaison,277 is authorized “to negotiate and
enter into cooperative agreements on behalf of the state with federally recognized
Indian tribes” within the state to address issues of mutual interest.278 While the state
has secured numerous tribal-state compacts through this and associated
mechanisms, the governor’s authority is explicitly curtailed with respect to any
agreement “involving the surface water and/or groundwater resources of this state
or which in whole or in part apportions surface and/or groundwater ownership.”279
The state has developed no water compact through this mechanism, and it has
otherwise had very little experience of water rights litigation, in general; what
litigation it has had has been locally idiosyncratic280 or otherwise lost in the
complexities of the state’s unique water law system, giving rise to significant
uncertainties.281
Oklahoma enacted its first water planning statute in 1963, which called for
the development of “statewide and local plans to assure the best and most effective
use and control of water to meet both the current and long-range needs of the
people of Oklahoma.”282 Relying on data from state and federal agencies, the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (Board) produced the first phase of a statewide
water plan in 1975,283 which included the following policy declaration:
The overall objective of the Plan is the maximum utilization of
the State’s water resources for all citizens. Because State law
notes that all stream water originating in or flowing through the
State, within limits of interstate compacts, is the property of the
State of Oklahoma, tribes must file for water rights. Equal care is
taken to ensure that these water rights are protected. Stream and
ground water rights currently held by various tribes were given
full consideration in the formulation of the plan to ensure this
protection, and water needs for present and long- range tribal
development have also been considered.284

since 2006, THE OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 24, 2017, http://newsok.com/article/5535467 (noting $7.2 billion
operations and construction impact, “of which 60 percent was in rural areas”).
277. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74 § 7401207 (2014).
278. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 74-1221 (B)-(C)(1) (2014).
279. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §1221(C)(3) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74 §1221(A) (2012).
280. E.g., Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963 Period, 22
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface Under the 1963
Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 19 (1970).
281. See, e.g., Gary Allison, Oklahoma Water Rights: What Good Are They?, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 469
(2012) (criticizing Oklahoma water law instability based on uncertainties relating to riparian rights, the
failure to address hydrologic interconnections, and the embrace of groundwater mining principles).
282. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1085.2 (2012).
283. OKLA. Water Res. Bd., PHASE 1: OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN (1975)
[hereinafter Okla. 1975 Plan]. Oklahoma water plan documents are generally available at http://www
.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/ocwp.php.
284. Id. at Summary 7-8.
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Again not appearing to provide for public participation, the Board produced its first
full water plan in 1980, in which it stated the following:
In regard to Indian water rights, the State of Oklahoma
recognizes the Winters Doctrine . . . , which doctrine maintains
that water rights may be attached to Indian reservations created
by lawful means, i.e., treaties, acts of Congress or executive
orders. However, it should be noted that no Indian reservations
presently exist in Oklahoma, with those previously existing being
substantially dissolved by allotment of lands in severalty during
the period of time from 1891 through 1906. The future water
needs of Oklahoma’s substantial Indian population have been
considered within the water requirement projections included in
the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan.285
Both of these statements manifest a specific view of and attitude toward tribal
water rightsone which directly discourages tribal participation or invocation of
federal law rights.
The Board did not update its water plan again until 1995,286 but this time,
it significantly engaged public input via two Water Plan Advisory Committees—a
Citizens Advisory Committee, which brought a “grass-roots perspective to the
planning table,” and a Technical Advisory Sub-Committee, which “allowed state
and federal water agencies to contribute their knowledge and experience.”287 There
is no indication in the 1995 Update of any outreach to American Indian tribes;
though, outside of these processes, other matters may have affected the state’s
approach.
First, after years of litigation,288 the state and several tribes negotiated and
were now implementing significant tax compacts,289 opting for negotiated
intergovernmental cooperation rather than conflict. Likewise, the state and several
tribes entered into gaming compacts pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act,290 producing positive economic impacts that have proven instrumental in
rebuilding tribal institutions, programs, and services.
Second, the Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma asserted
their water rights during this period to object to a state effort to sell water

285. Okla. Water Res. Bd., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN 11 (1980) [hereinafter Okla.
1980 Plan].
286. Okla. Water Res. Bd., UPDATE OF THE OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN (1995)
[hereinafter Okla. 1995 Update].
287. Id. at 6.
288. E.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838
(1989).
289. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 346 (2014) (authorizing the state executive to enter tobacco tax
compact with tribal sovereigns); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 500.63 (2013) (same with respect to motor fuel
taxes). The full collection of tribal-state compacts in Oklahoma are available at the website of the
Oklahoma Secretary of State: https://www.sos.ok.gov/gov/tribal.aspx.
290. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 3A, §§ 261 (codifying model state-tribal compact offer).
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originating from the tribes’ historic treaty territory to out-of-state water users.291
Those tribal claims triggered a new era in the handling of tribal water rights in
Oklahoma, as suggested by the 1995 Plan’s statement:
Indian water rights in Oklahoma concern both fundamental
sovereignty and water quantity and quality. Indian claims to
water rights could have a significant effect on existing state water
law as well as the current system of water rights administration
and water quality regulation in Oklahoma.292
Consistent with this new recognition of the subject matter significance, the
Board included in the 1995 Update a call for increased outreach, partnership, and
the identification of specific projects the state and tribes could pursue jointly in an
effort to “develop a level of trust” and seek resolution of “the Indian water rights
issue in a non-confrontational manner. . . . “293 The primary efforts toward this end
were spent on addressing Chickasaw and Choctaw opposition to the state’s plan to
sell water to Texas water users and coming to terms on a possible compact.294
However, those efforts failed to produce a compact and, instead, resulted in the state
legislature’s restricting the Governor’s compacting authority, as already
described.295
Prior to the completion of its next 2012 water plan update, three new
developments further affected tribal-state relations. First, in a natural resources
damages lawsuit Oklahoma filed against poultry farmers in the upper Illinois River
watershed, the federal district court issued a July 2009 dismissal of state claims on
the grounds that the Cherokee Nation, which was not a party to the action and
could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, had “a real and substantial
interest in some as-yet undetermined portion of the waters of the Illinois River.”296
The court dismissed the state’s damages claims notwithstanding an agreement its
Attorney General had entered with the Cherokee Nation on the subject,297 nor
would it later allow the Cherokee Nation to intervene, concluding such motion was
untimely.298 In short, the unanswered questions relating to tribal water rights in
Oklahoma resulted in the state’s inability to pursue a high-profile integrated
resource damages claim.299
291. Lambert, supra note 71, at 209-10.
292. Okla. Water Res. Bd., supra note 285, at 119.
293. Id.
294. See Okla. H. Con. Res. 1066 (1999) (directing Oklahoma Water Resources Board to work with
the Choctaw Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, and local representatives on the development and protection
of the Kiamichi River); see also Okla. Water Res. Bd., FINAL REPORT: KIAMICHI RIVER BASIN WATER
RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT
PLAN
(2000),
https://www.owrb.ok.gov/studies/report
s/reports_pdf/KiamichiWRDPlan_2000.pdf; Okla. Water Res. Bd., JOINT STATE/TRIBAL WATER
COMPACT & WATER MARKETING PROPOSALS (2002),
295. See supra note 278 and accompanying text; see also Mark A. Willingham, The Oklahoma
Water Sale Moratorium: How Fear and Misunderstanding Led to an Unconstitutional Law, 12 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 357 (2009).
296. Tyson, 258 F.R.D. at 479.
297. Id. at 475-76.
298. Oklahoma ex. rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Food, Inc., et al., 619 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 2010).
299. Greetham, supra note 5, at 599-601.
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Next, in May 2010, a state policy group coordinated with the Board to
hold a multi-day, state-wide public input session on water and water resource
matters as an adjunct to the state’s water planning efforts. This session produced a
final report, which included the following consensus policy recommendation:
State/Tribal Issues. State and tribal issues must be resolved
through meaningful government-to-government negotiations,
preservation and building up on history of “good neighbor”
relations, and implementation of the specific recommendations
made on this subject in the 1995 state water plan so that the state
and tribes can work cooperatively and more efficiently to resolve
water issues. Tribal governments should be involved in the
development of the 50 Year Water Plan so as to best address
tribal water issues . . . . 300
This statement, produced through a consensus-based public input process, marked a
significant departure from the prior discussed state policy statements concerning
tribal relations and water.
Finally, in August 2011, Oklahoma faced its first tribal water litigation
when the Chickasaw and Choctaw filed suit to stop a proposed trans-basin water
project affecting their historic treaty territories.301 In this suit, the tribes argued
Oklahoma was preempted from exercising state law authority over the proposed
transfer without federal law inquiry into the potential impact such administrative
action would have on the tribes’ claimed treaty right to a sustainable homeland.302
The tribes alleged that resort to litigation was necessary because the state has not
taken seriously their prior efforts to seek cooperative resolution.303
In response,Oklahoma’s former Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who now
serves as Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
under President Donald Trump, personally wrote to Oklahoma citizens in several of
the affected basins to express the state’s position that, one, it was “doubtful” the
tribes had any water rights whatsoever and, two, responsive litigation, i.e., a statefiled general stream adjudication, was the only means available “to move forward
with any confidence that [the state] will not be plagued with claims of Tribal rights
again and again in the future as either moods or tribal leaders change.”304 Through
his office, he then represented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the tribes’

300. Okla. Acad. Town Hall Nat’l Emp. Dev. Ctr., WATER: FINAL REPORT 9 (2010),
https://www.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/pdf_ocwp/TownHall_FinalReport.pdf.
301. E.g., Felicity Barringer, Indians Join Fight for an Oklahoma Lake’s Flow, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
2011, at A1; Stephen H. Greetham, Water Policy in the Former Indian Territory: Chickasaw, Choctaw,
and Oklahoma at a Crossroads over Sardis Reservoir, 82 THE WATER REPORT 1 (2010); David Moon,
Oklahoma Water Storage: Tribal Concerns Raised, 79 THE WATER REPORT (2010).
302. Complaint at 5, Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma v. Fallin, No. 5:11-CV927 (W.D. Okla., Aug. 18, 2011).
303. E.g., Okla. Water Res. Bd., SPECIAL MEETING OFFICIAL MINUTES 8 (2010) (recording Choctaw
Nation Chief Pyle’s request that state delay action on controversial water project); Letter from Governor
Bill Anoatubby and Chief Greg Pyle to Governor Mary Fallin (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with author);
Letter from Michael Burrage to Attorney General Scott Pruitt (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with author).
304. Letter from Oklahoma Attorney General E. Scott Pruitt to “Oklahomans and Others with water
rights to protect” at 4-5 (Feb. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
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lawsuit put “the very future of [the] State of Oklahoma” at risk, warning that the
“State could become an economic dust bowl” if the tribal lawsuit proceeded in
federal court.305
In the midst of (and contrast to) this rancor, the Board completed its most
recent water plan update306 and, in doing so, for the first time included specific
outreach to tribal governments. This outreach began prior to the litigation through
the Board’s contracting a member of the University of Oklahoma College of Law
faculty to serve as liaison with tribal representatives in a series of informal
consultations.307 These consultations, the tribal participants to which were not
disclosed, resulted in a report and recommendations that differed starkly from the
Attorney General’s contemporaneous legal position.308 Specifically, the report and
the 2012 plan update’s policy recommendations regarding tribal water issues
emphasized the substantive reality of unaddressed tribal water rights in
Oklahoma309 and focused on the state’s lack of process for tribal-state engagement,
calling on it to:





identify what state government entity has the authority to develop a tribalstate water rights negotiation process, to conduct such negotiations, and
approve any product of negotiation once completed;
establish an authorized team to work with tribal representatives on the
development of a negotiation process;
engage with tribes, pursuant to such established process, to complete
binding negotiated resolution of claims; and
develop and implement tribal-state consultation protocols.310

Oklahoma has taken no specific legislative or administrative steps based
on its 2012 Update’s recommendation, though in August 2016, Oklahoma and the
Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations announced a comprehensive settlement of
litigation that addressed the proposed trans-basin project and included a framework
for tribal-state engagement on future water permitting and planning.311

305. Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction at 4, Okla. Water Res. Bd. v. United States, No.
110375 (Okla. S. Ct., Feb. 10, 2012).
306. Okla. Water Res. Bd., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN: EXECUTIVE REPORT (2012).
307. Okla. Water Res. Bd., OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT:
TRIBAL WATER ISSUES & RECOMMENDATIONS (2011).
308. Update of the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, Executive Report, supra note 305, at 13;
Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, Tribal Water Issues and Recommendations, supra note 306, at 9.
309. Update of the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, Executive Report, supra note 305, at 3536 (observing regarding tribal water claims in Oklahoma that “judicial rules of treaty construction—that
treaties with Tribes are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them, that ambiguities in
Indian treaties are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians—tend to favor the tribal position”).
310. Id. at 13 (stating the policy recommendation of “Building Cooperation to Avoid Future Conflict
and Remove Uncertainties to Water Use”).
311. Joe Wertz & Logan Layden, INSIDE THE LANDMARK STATE AND TRIBAL AGREEMENT THAT
ENDS STANDOFF OVER WATER IN SOUTHEAST OKLAHOMA, NPR.com, (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2016/08/12/inside-the-landmark-state-and-tribal-agreement-thatends-standoff-over-water-in-southeast-oklahoma/.
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Observations on the Experiences in California, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma

The experiences of California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma show a range
of approaches and results: California and New Mexico have achieved a significant
level of tribal engagement, while Oklahoma has not.
With respect to the historical and relational context, none of these states
depart markedly from the generalized discussion of Part II.312 One might suggest
that California and Oklahoma, both of which were founded in contexts that
involved substantial tribal dispossessions enacted by law and violence, would
problematize their outreach efforts. Indeed, Berkey intimated as much,313 and the
apprehension of tribes to participate in Oklahoma’s planning process is
documented;314 on the other side of the table in Oklahoma, its litigation positions
continue to adhere to arguments that cast tribal treaty rights as presenting an
existential threat to the state itself, suggesting a significant hostility regarding tribal
sovereignty.315 Notwithstanding both states’ having difficult histories, their
approaches and experiences differ markedly, however— with California’s outreach
and engagement obtaining positive tribal response after only a few years’ effort,
while Oklahoma’s fractured approach has failed to engage directly with tribes,
despite having identified it as a policy priority twenty years ago.
With respect to legal processes, each state has significant experience
litigating and negotiating with tribal governments. In California and New Mexico,
this experience includes engagement over water rights, which has been playing out
for decades, and has produced numerous tribal water right settlements.316
Conversely, though it has had substantial experience in the litigation and
negotiation of compacts with American Indian tribes on other complex
intergovernmental matters,317 Oklahoma has participated in only one tribal water
lawsuit and negotiation, which was only recently initiated and completed.318 While
Oklahoma’s relative lack of experience in water resource litigation and negotiation
may be relevant, the experience of each state suggests an ability to bridge complex
differences with tribal sovereigns and to find cooperative approaches on divisive
issues.

312. See supra notes 9-76 and accompanying text.
313. Berkey, supra note 5, at 2.
314. Tribal distrust of state planners is evident in the 2011 supplemental report to the Oklahoma
Comprehensive Water Plan, Tribal Water Issues & Recommendations, supra note 306, which records
concerns, based on the state’s failure to implement prior policy statements regarding tribal outreach
“that their interests were being ignored”, at 2; likewise, the anonymous tribal participants expressed
distrust that their participation “would be construed as support for the end product” even though they
“lack[ed] control over that product”, at 3; other concerns focused on the state’s potential to use any
information a tribe may provide against them in future legal proceedings regarding water rights”, at 2.
315. See supra notes 303-04, and accompanying text. Cf. Osage Nation v. Okla., ex rel. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (ruling against tribal preemption argument and,
in so doing, emphasizing the state attorney general’s arguments of the “staggering” implications and
near-existential threat occasioned by the tribe’s jurisdictional argument).
316. See supra notes191-94, 228-33, and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 276-77, 288-89, and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 300-04, 310, and accompanying text.
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Finally, in each of these states, American Indian tribal communities have
successfully engaged in tribal institution building and economic development
initiatives in accord with federal self-determination policies,319 which create
additional opportunities for mutually beneficial intergovernmental alliances.320
Rather than suggest challenges, this characteristic would suggest a greater
likelihood of success for tribal-state engagement, if the effort were properly framed
and supported.
Turning to the details of each state’s effort, larger distinctions appear.
Specifically, success appears driven by the substance and institutional foundation
for outreach efforts. New Mexico’s and California’s outreach, for example,
specifically included a focus on establishing known mechanics and protocols for
intergovernmental engagement. Both states established high- level liaisons within
their respective chief executive’s offices and have launched agency-specific
implementation strategies and projects across state government. Furthermore, both
states developed the mechanics and protocols for intergovernmental engagement
through government- to-government talks with American Indian tribes, building a
mutual investment in the success of those efforts.
Additionally, both California and New Mexico have made high-level
institutional commitments to their efforts. In New Mexico, the state’s efforts are
founded on both statutory and executive department authorizations, while state
efforts in California have been founded on explicit executive department actions
alone. In both instances, implementation has been led by the state’s chief executive,
and in both states, tribal communities have responded.
In contrast, Oklahoma lacks a functional mechanism or protocol for
government-to- government tribal engagement on water issues, and while statute
authorizes the state governor to negotiate agreements with tribes on matters of
mutual interest, that same statute expressly ties the governor’s hands with respect
to water resource agreements. Tribal concerns on this point are well documented in
the state’s 2012 plan update321 and were otherwise publicly cited as reason for the
initiation of litigation in 2011.322
Additionally, while the state’s lead water planning agency has consistently
acknowledged interest in and the importance of collaborative engagement with
tribal governments,323 its prior plan’s preemptive denial of the validity of tribal
water right claims324 appears to continue with some force and influence through the
positions of other executive department denials of the legitimacy and substance of
tribal claims to sovereignty, relying on polarizing rhetoric of tribal “otherness” that
cast tribal treaty rights as a marked existential threat to state government.325 At
best, the history of Oklahoma’s institutional approach to tribal governments
regarding water suggests dysfunction, ambivalence, and uncertainty. By any
319. See supra notes 187-90, 226, 275, and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 68-69, and accompanying text.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra note 305.
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 291, 310-11, and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 281-83, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 303-04, 314, and accompanying text.
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measure, its track record regarding tribal engagement stands in stark contrast to
California’s and New Mexico’s.
D.

Lessons, Questions, and Concluding Thoughts

When one examines water conflict, substantial common interests can
appear. While parties differ on how they would individually approach a given issue,
for example, they may share common ground in the desire for reliable access to and
management of water resources, improved community and intergovernmental
relations, locally appropriate economic development, and effective planning for a
future of shared success.326 The history of water in the United States (and
elsewhere) is easily viewed as a history of conflict, and our reliance on adversarial
processes tends to focus differing parties on disaggregating competition while
blinding them to potential common ground.
There are, of course, exceptions—modes of conflict and responses that
can “serve as an embryo from which cooperation can emerge.”327 The challenge is
to create the environment in which that opportunity can emerge. Notwithstanding
their successes so far, it is not clear yet whether California’s or New Mexico’s
efforts will create those sorts of opportunities, but they mark a start in the right
direction.
In their work on heterogeneities in common pool resource disputes,
Schlager and Blomquist discuss interaction orientations such as individualism,
competition, altruism, and hostility, and they identify solidarity—the state in which
a benefit to any member of a group is viewed as success for the members of the
group—as a necessary “precondition to unrestricted cooperation.”328 Likewise, in
discussing mechanisms that foster the necessary conditions for cooperation, they
discuss the value of strategies such as building efforts on common or related sets of
interests329 or party types.330
In a fascinating article, geographer Zoltán Grossman brings these concepts
to life in his exploration of case studies of natural resource conflicts involving
tribal and non-tribal communities.331 In each of his cases, “members of Native and
rural white communities unexpectedly came together to protect the same natural
resources from a perceived outside threat.”332 In each conflict, a tribal group
asserted a treaty based right to the affected resource that was damaged by the
subject activity, and triggered “a backlash from some rural whites” and “created a
conflict around the use of land or natural resources.”333 And in each of his selected
cases, Grossman shows, as the conflict’s intensity calmed over time, tribal and nontribal factions “initiated dialogue” and “increased collaboration around the
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protection of their community livelihood and common natural resources.”334 As he
observes, the combatants ultimately “believed that if they continued to contest the
place, to fight over resources, there may not be any left to fight over.”335
Grossman identified key factors that facilitated this shift. Chief among
them was a shared sense of place or “‘place membership,’ based on local-scale
multiethnic territorial identity” that served as a replacement for a more narrow
“state citizenship”; integral to this commonality was the combatants’ ability to
build “a sense of a common place or a common bond to the landscape.”336 Next, he
emphasized the importance of developing a “common purpose in legal, political, or
economic fields” as well as a shared desire to find resolution rather than mere
partisan victory—or, as he put it, “a sense of a common understanding.”337
Fundamentally, Grossman documents efforts within diverse communities to build
upon a shared interest in a common, if not collective, enjoyment of place and
appurtenant resources and, thus, to shift from distributive competition to integrative
cooperation.
While conflict is our tradition with respect to management of water
resources and while the potential for conflict inheres to the tribal-state relationship,
conflict is not the only path we can take in our search for progress. The options our
formal dispute resolution mechanisms present are limited, i.e., litigation or formal
negotiation, and our nearly exclusive reliance on these tools has so far produced
only modest progress. However, options for seeking collaborative engagement,
conflict avoidance, and mutual problem solving appear far more extensive, and as
water planning methodologies grow more sophisticated, opportunities for greater
progress through constructive, non-adversarial engagement may open.
Given the challenges we face in reconciling America’s colonial past with
its constitutional present, it seems significant that private and public good, both
tribal and non-tribal, would be well served by our continuing to “be even more
creative”338 in our exploration of all potential paths. Our failure to do so may result
in, as Grossman observes, our contest over place and may leave us with no place to
fight over.339
IV.

CONCLUSION

More than 100 years have passed since the Supreme Court announced its
framework for tribal reserved rights to water,340 and nearly forty years have passed
since finalization of the first negotiated settlement of tribal water rights. In that
time, tribes, states, and the federal government have wrestled with how to do
justice to tribal claims within the complex physical, legal, and political realities of
water use and needs. We have made progress, though not enough, and if we want to
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make further progress, to borrow the words of the Wester Water Policy Review
Advisory Committee, we “will have to be even more creative.”341
Stepping aside from our adversarial processes, water planning appears to
be a tool well-suited for the further pursuit of collaborative engagement and
problem solving, and the experiences in California and New Mexico show that
integrated and well supported state engagement efforts within a government-togovernment framework can be successful in promoting tribal-state water planning
efforts. Planning cannot substitute for the law’s ability to provide enforceable
finality, but—creatively structured and skillfully used—it may provide a means for
enhanced intergovernmental engagement that could lead to more efficient dispute
resolution in the future. It could, perhaps, even facilitate sustainable and just
conflict avoidance.

341. See supra note141.

